



AFRICA AT A TIPPING POINT

2017
Forum Report

MO IBRAHIM FOUNDATION



Between 2015 and 2050, Africa's youth will almost double, from 230 to 452 million.

The fastest growing African economies have not created enough jobs for youth.

In 2015, 60% of Africans were under 25 years old.

In 2016, the average age of African presidents is 66, while the average median age of the continent's population is 20.

Of the 25 fastest growing economies in the world between 2004 and 2014, ten are African.

Nearly 15 million young Africans were unemployed in 2015.

In 2015, four African countries featured in the global top ten for the highest terrorism levels: Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt, Libya.

Between one-third and a half of the tertiary educated populations of Kenya, Uganda, Liberia, Mozambique and Ghana leave their country.

A majority of African citizens trust religious leaders, the army and their traditional leaders more than their elected representatives.

Over a decade, the number of terrorist attacks on the African continent has increased by more than 1,000%.

On average, almost half of the African population is currently still below the legal voting age.

For more than a quarter of Africa's population the leader has not changed for the last ten years, and often much longer.

Somalia, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda have still not ratified the 2004 Protocol to the 1999 AU Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.

56 African Heads of State have left office over the last decade, including nine that died in office and 13 stepping down following a coup, an arrest or an uprising.

Less than a quarter of Africa's youth is "very interested in public affairs".

Over a decade the number of protests and riots have increased more than tenfold.



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Introduction

The Ibrahim Forum, held annually since 2010, focuses on the challenges of critical importance to Africa, for which wise leadership and sound governance are essential.

Bringing together a diverse range of high-level African stakeholders from the public and private arenas as well as influential partners based outside the continent, the Forum prides itself on promoting open and frank discussion. It aims to go beyond the familiar analysis of problems and restatement of commitments to encourage fresh, pragmatic solutions and shared responsibilities.

To help achieve these ambitions, the Foundation produces a Forum Report ahead of each annual event. This compiles facts and figures using the most relevant and recent data and insights around the topics for discussion.

The focus of the 2017 Forum is “Africa at a tipping point” and what needs to be done to ensure that Africa’s progress continues to rise rather than fall back. The result of this defining moment depends more than anything else on our ability to harness the energy, and meet the expectations, of Africa’s young people.

60% of the continent’s population are under 25 years of age. In 2050, Africa will be home to 452 million people between the ages of 15 and 24. Their drive, ambition and potential provide African countries with an extraordinary asset.

But today, too many of them feel devoid of economic prospects and robbed of any say on the future of their own continent.

The commodity cycle of the past decade may have supercharged many African GDPs but it created almost no jobs. Young people may have spent more years in school but too few have been equipped with the skills the economy needs. The more educated they are, the less likely they are to find employment on their own continent.

The nature and fit of democracy is also being tested. “Free and fair” elections have indeed multiplied over the last decade, leading

to peaceful changes of power. But voter turnout is declining and scepticism about elected representatives growing. An average gap of 46 years between the people and their rulers fuels doubt about whether those elected to office can relate to the interests of their citizens. Meanwhile, alternative political models such as China, and the rise of populism and parochialism in Western countries, which some believe will lead to better economic futures, weaken the appeal of current democratic models.

The lack of economic opportunity mixed with democratic fatigue and political disenfranchisement may become a “toxic brew”. The 1000% increase in terrorist attacks in Africa over a decade and the rising number of those risking their lives to cross the Mediterranean show where frustration, anger and despair can lead. Climate change, created elsewhere but impacting Africa the most, will only intensify these problems.

Terrorism’s growing footprint on the continent is fuelling conflict, division and instability and damaging prosperity by acting as a parasite on economies. It has become a well-organised multi-billion dollar criminal enterprise with growing control over the drugs trade, people trafficking and other parts of the black market. The jobs, status and income that terrorism offers to young people who are cut off from the mainstream economy, may be more attractive than the ideology itself.

High hopes can also lead to deep frustrations. If the energy and ambition of Africa’s youth continue to be wasted, they could become serious destabilising forces, threatening not just future progress but rolling back the gains of recent years. This huge and immediate challenge requires committed leadership and robust governance if Africa is to enable its young people to build the prosperous and peaceful future we all want to see.

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2 ZERO HUNGER

End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.



4 QUALITY EDUCATION

Ensure inclusive and quality education for all and promote lifelong learning.



7 AFFORDABLE AND CLEAN ENERGY

Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.



8 DECENT WORK AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all.



9 INDUSTRY, INNOVATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation.



13 CLIMATE ACTION

Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.



17 PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE GOALS


Revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development.

01_What Prospects for Africa's Youth?

AFRICA'S COMPELLING DYNAMICS: A YOUNG CONTINENT, GROWING FAST


Back on the growth path

African population & real GDP growth rate, Africa




- Africa's real GDP grew at 2.1% in 2016. After a significant decline between 2012 and 2016, this growth is projected to reach 4.5% by 2021.
- While Asia and the Pacific and Central America experienced higher economic growth than Africa in 2016 (5.2% and 3.9%, respectively), Africa is predicted to be the second fastest growing region again in 2019 with a 4.4% real GDP growth rate. Only Asia and the Pacific will grow faster (at a 5.4% rate).
- However, at an estimated \$2,948 billion in 2021, the entirety of Africa's GDP will still only be slightly larger than three quarters of India's GDP and around 16% of China's.

Real GDP growth rate, main world regions



Nominal GDP, Africa's 10 largest economies (2006-2021)



African countries among the world's best performers

- Many African countries now rank among the world's best performers for economic growth:
 - Of the 25 fastest growing economies in the world between 2004 and 2014, ten were African.
 - Of the top 20 countries with the highest services growth between 2006 and 2014, eight were African.
 - Of the top 20 countries with the highest growth in industrial output between 2006 and 2014, nine were African.



GDP growth: African countries in the world's fastest growing economies

World rank	Country	Annual GDP growth (%)
4 th	Ethiopia	10.8
7 th	Angola	9.9
13 th	Rwanda	7.8
13 th	Sierra Leone	7.8
17 th	Zambia	7.6
19 th	Nigeria	7.4
20 th	Ghana	7.3
20 th	Mozambique	7.3
23 rd	Uganda	6.8
25 th	Liberia	6.9

Average annual percentage in real terms, 2004-14



Growth in services: African countries in the world's 20 fastest growing economies by services

World rank	Country	Annual GDP growth (%)
1 st	Ethiopia	13.5
9 th	Nigeria	9.5
11 th	Zambia	9.4
13 th	Rwanda	9.3
14 th	Zimbabwe	9.1
15 th	DRC	8.4
16 th	Mozambique	8.3
17 th	Ghana	8.0



Growth in industrial output: African countries in the world's 20 fastest growing economies by industrial output

World rank	Country	Annual GDP growth (%)
2 nd	Sierra Leone	23.6
3 rd	Liberia	19.9
4 th	Ethiopia	14.4
7 th	Ghana	11.0
10 th	Niger	10.1
11 th	Rwanda	9.3
13 th	Tanzania	8.2
16 th	Zambia	7.5
17 th	Burkina Faso	7.4


Average annual percentage in real terms, 2006-14

01_What Prospects for Africa's Youth?

AFRICA'S COMPELLING DYNAMICS: A YOUNG CONTINENT, GROWING FAST

The youngest continent


Africa's youth map



- Africa's population is currently 1.2 billion and is expected to more than double by 2050. By which time:
 - More than half of the 2.4 billion people projected to join the global population will be African.
 - A quarter of the world's population will be African.
- Africa is already the world's youngest continent:
 - In 2015, 60% of Africans were under 25 years of age.
 - In 2015, the youth (between 15 and 24 years of age), amounted to almost one fifth of the 1.2 billion population in Africa.
 - Between 2015 and 2050, Africa's youth will almost double, growing from 230 to 452 million.
- By the end of the century, nearly half of the world's youth (47%) will be African. Africa's youth – with 632 million people – will be bigger than Asia's and nearly ten times bigger than Europe's.

KEY	
Population aged 15-24	
	20-24%
	19-19.9%
	14-18.9%

Distribution of global youth population, main world regions



Actual & projected youth population (millions)

	1950	2000	2050	2100
Africa	44	164	452	632
Asia	262	669	652	521
Europe	96	101	72	68
Latin America & the Caribbean	32	102	96	72
North America	26	44	52	55

■ Africa
 ■ Asia
 ■ Europe
■ Latin America & the Caribbean
■ North America

MIF based on (2): UNDESA

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AFRICA'S COMPELLING DYNAMICS: A YOUNG CONTINENT, GROWING FAST

The youth bulge: dividend or threat?


Africa's youth bulge:

- Constitutes a source of both labour inputs and human capital in production, improving total factor productivity in a region of the world where capital formation is limited.
- Constitutes a reliable source of demand for a country's economy through their consumption activity. Simply lowering the youth unemployment rate to that of adults would lead to a 10-20% increase in Africa's GDP.
- Is fundamental for the development of a new class of African entrepreneurs.
- Means that Africa has the opportunity to reap a "demographic dividend". As the total dependency ratio is projected to decrease steadily until 2085 (55.7%, compared to 82.6% in 2005), there will be a larger workforce supporting fewer children and elderly people. The lower dependency burden will free up resources for development.

However, failure to harness this dividend could be a threat. The consequences of not taking full advantage of the youth's potential are wide-ranging, including significant economic losses, armed conflict, brain-drain, as well as political and social unrest and instability.

AfDB; Brookings; UNDESA


Total dependency ratio, Africa



There were nearly 9 million out-of-school primary school-age children in Nigeria in 2010. This exclusion paves the way to future dissatisfaction, frustration and the search for alternative prospects.

Educate A Child & Results for Development

Out-of-school primary school-age children, both sexes




SPOTLIGHT | URBAN YOUTH

- In the next 35 years, Africa's urban population is expected to almost triple, from 472 million to 1.3 billion.
- Youth unemployment rates are generally higher in urban than rural areas in Africa.
- When urban growth does not go hand in hand with structural transformation, fast-growing African cities fail at providing their youth with jobs.
- Gambia, Libya and South Africa, who already have more than half of their population living in urban areas, also have some of the highest levels of youth unemployment (>40%).

AfDB, OECD & UNDP; Baah-Boateng, W.; MIF based on: UNDESA

Population growth rural and urban




AFRICA'S GROWTH: STILL MAINLY JOBLESS

Growth over the last decade: mainly export-led


- The commodity super-cycle has been the major driver of real GDP growth in Africa over the last decade.
- As such, the end of the commodity boom, along with declining demand from abroad, especially from China, have driven down the continent's GDP (from 6.4% in 2012 to 2.1% in 2016).
- In particular, oil prices have decreased significantly. The price of a barrel of oil decreased from \$105/barrel in 2012 to \$43/barrel in 2016.
- Africa's oil exporters have been severely affected by such a plunge in prices. For instance, Equatorial Guinea saw its economy shrink by 9.9% in 2016.
- While the price of copper per metric tonne decreased from \$8,828 in 2011 to \$4,868 in 2016, the nominal GDP of Zambia, a copper exporter, decreased by more than \$7 billion during the three years preceding 2016.

IMF, IMF (2); World Bank, World Bank (2)


Oil price, Diversification, Revenue Mobilisation & Sustainable Economic Opportunity



Copper prices & Zambia's nominal GDP



Real GDP growth, African oil exporters




01_What Prospects for Africa's Youth?

AFRICA'S GROWTH: STILL MAINLY JOBLESS

Youth unemployment remains high

Real GDP growth & youth unemployment, 51 African countries over 11 years



- The strong economic growth of the last decade has not created jobs for youth.
- Looking at 51 countries during the period 2006-2016, there is no correlation, even weak, between economic growth and youth unemployment.
- Countries can display very similar youth unemployment rates and have markedly different GDP growth. For instance, in 2016 the youth unemployment rate in both Sudan and Kenya is 22%, even though Kenya's GDP growth is 6.0%, nearly double Sudan's rate of 3.1%.

Agriculture: the New Frontier?

Real GDP growth & youth unemployment rate, selected African countries



- Over the last ten years, while Africa's real GDP has grown at an annual average of 4.5%, youth unemployment levels have remained quite stable.
- In Côte d'Ivoire and Djibouti (some of the fastest growing African economies with a real GDP growth of 6.5% or higher in 2016), economic growth has not been accompanied by a substantial reduction in youth unemployment rates.
- In the case of Djibouti, youth unemployment has even increased (from 11.5% in 2006 to 11.8% in 2016).
- Non mineral resource-rich countries have managed high economic growth alongside lower levels of unemployment, especially economies that rely more on agriculture such as Ethiopia and Tanzania.
- During 2006-2015, Ethiopia's nominal GDP increased by 303.3%, and Tanzania's grew by more than 100%.
- At the same time, already relatively low youth unemployment levels kept decreasing in Tanzania (from 5.7% to 4.9%) and remained relatively stable in Ethiopia (from 7.4% to 8.1%).


ILO; IMF; MIF based on: IMF

ACBF; ILO; MIF based on: IMF

01_What Prospects for Africa's Youth?

SPOTLIGHT | AN ETHIOPIAN SUCCESS STORY: AGRICULTURE

General unemployment, youth unemployment, real GDP growth & total population, Ethiopia



- Although Ethiopia's share of urban population is growing fast, due to high population growth, the absolute number of people living in rural areas is increasing significantly as well.
- From 2000 to 2050 the rural population living in Ethiopia will have doubled (from 56.3 million to 117.1 million).
- Although its economic growth has reduced in recent years, the country performs better than most African countries in terms of economic growth and job creation.
- General unemployment and youth unemployment rates have remained relatively stable since 2006.
- While the continent's general unemployment and youth unemployment rates were 8.0% and 13.0% in 2016, these figures were significantly lower in the case of Ethiopia (5.7% and 8.1%, respectively).

In Ethiopia, agriculture is the largest sector of the economy, providing jobs for 80% of the workforce and accounting for more than 40% of the country's GDP.

- Recognising the importance of the agricultural sector for employment creation and poverty reduction within its large rural population, the Ethiopian government launched several strategies, namely the strategy for an "Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization", the "Sustainable Development and Poverty

Reduction Programme" (SDPRP), and the "Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP).


- Ethiopia's public budget prioritises the growth-oriented pro-poor sectors of education, agriculture and food security, water and sanitation, health and roads. In 2012/2013, the public sector investment in those areas accounted for over 70% of general government spending.

AFRICA'S YOUTH: THE SKILLS MISMATCH

Better educated & less employed

- African youth face unemployment rates that are twice those of adults.
- Despite being the second largest African economy, South Africa is not able to provide jobs for more than half of its youth population.
- More than a third of the youth in Egypt and almost half in Libya are unemployed (33.4% and 48.1%, respectively).
- Between one-quarter and one-third of the youth are unemployed in Algeria and Tunisia (26.6% and 35.7%, respectively) and one fifth in Morocco (20.6%).

AfDB; ILO; MIF based on: ILO; UNDESA



No data available for Seychelles and South Sudan.

ILO


01_What Prospects for Africa's Youth?

AFRICA'S YOUTH: THE SKILLS MISMATCH

Employment in Africa: higher education is not an asset

Employment by level of education

% of total employed population



- In most African countries for which there are data available in the last ten years (16 countries), the majority of people employed only have a basic level of education.
- Algeria, Mauritius and South Africa have the highest rates of employed people with an advanced education (23.0%, 22.1% and 20.3%, respectively).

ILO


Aggregate Levels of Education	International Standard Classification of Education 2011 (ISCED-11)
Less than basic	X. No schooling 0. Early childhood education
Basic	1. Primary education 2. Lower secondary education
Intermediate	3. Upper secondary education 4. Post-secondary non-tertiary education
Advanced	5. Short-cycle tertiary education 6. Bachelor's or equivalent level 7. Master's or equivalent level 8. Doctoral or equivalent level

The more educated, the less employed?

- There is a slightly positive correlation between levels of youth unemployment and the gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education programmes during the period 2006-2016.
- Despite having some of the most educated populations (with gross enrolment ratios in tertiary education over 30%), Egypt and Tunisia also have some of the highest youth unemployment rates on the continent, greater than 30%.

Too many humanities graduates, too few engineers

Tertiary graduates by field of study



UNESCO

- In Djibouti, Algeria, Mauritania, Ghana, Benin, Madagascar and Sudan, there is a much higher percentage of tertiary graduates in fields of study such as arts and humanities, than in others such as engineering, manufacturing and construction.
- The countries that have a higher percentage of graduates in engineering, manufacturing and construction are Tunisia, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mauritius, Gambia, Ethiopia and Burundi.
- Less than 5% of graduates have specialised in information and communication technologies in Mauritania, Sudan, South Africa, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Algeria, Benin, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Lesotho and Mozambique, whose youth populations collectively account for around one third of African 15-24 year-olds.
- Both the AU Agenda 2063 and the African Common Position on the Post-2015 development agenda underline that science, technology and innovation are key pillars for Africa's development.


AfDB; MIF based on: UNDESA; UNESCO

01_What Prospects for Africa's Youth?

AFRICA'S YOUTH: THE SKILLS MISMATCH

Comparative disadvantage with Latin America & Asia


Tertiary graduates by field of study, Latin America & the Caribbean



- In the majority of countries for which data are available in Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia, engineering, manufacturing and construction are the most popular fields of study among tertiary education students.
- Iran has the highest percentage of tertiary education graduates in the fields of engineering, manufacturing and construction (32.4%).
- Only Argentina, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Lebanon and Laos have more tertiary education graduates in the fields of arts and humanities.
- Vietnam, Mexico and Malaysia have high percentages of tertiary graduates in the fields of engineering, manufacturing and construction (21.4%, 23.0% and 26.7%, respectively) and relatively low youth unemployment rates (6.7%, 9.4% and 11.3%, respectively).

ILO; UNESCO

Tertiary graduates by field of study, Asia



UNESCO

SPOTLIGHT | A MOROCCAN SUCCESS STORY: AERONAUTICS


The emerging Moroccan aerospace industry shows the possibilities for youth job creation and benefits of tailoring education to industry requirements.

Tertiary education graduates in Morocco have graduated from a broader set of fields of study than most African countries. This provided a foundation for an emerging aerospace industry near Casablanca.

In 1997 the Moroccan Seddik Belyamini, then Boeing's Executive President for Worldwide Sales in Seattle, led an internal search within Boeing to identify what aerospace components might be reliably produced in Casablanca. The study led to the creation of a joint venture – Matis – between Boeing, Royal Air Maroc, and the Moroccan firm Labinal to outsource assembly of wire harnesses to Morocco. Though initially expecting around 30% productivity growth, Matis achieved 70% within two years and now builds wire bundles for the Boeing 737, 747, 757, 767 and 777. Airbus, SNECMA, Bombardier, and Embraer have set up export facilities in the same industrial parks.

Morocco's revealed comparative advantage in airplane parts

Balassa index score of revealed comparative advantage




Source: Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage. These calculations are derived from Caroline Freund and Theodore Moran. Multinational Investors as Export Superstars: How Emerging Market Governments Can Reshape Comparative Advantage Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. 2016

The total value of Morocco's exports of aircraft parts rocketed from \$3.8m in 2002 to \$369.6m in 2015. According to the Balassa Index, Morocco's comparative advantage in airplane parts has likewise increased.

This diversification of exports is part of a structural transformation in the economy which has stimulated changes in education and foreign direct investment (FDI) promotion. In 2009 Morocco renovated its Agency in Charge of Promoting FDI and also established an Institute for Aeronautical Training as a collaboration between the Organization of Moroccan Aeronautics Companies (Groupement des Industriels Marocain Aeronautique et Spatial or GIMAS), the Union of Metallurgical Workers and the Ministries of Labour, Industry. GIMAS plays a central role in the design of the curriculum, with continuous course renovation to meet the needs of current and potential employers.

Total value of exports of aircraft parts, Morocco

Exports value (millions \$)



01_What Prospects for Africa's Youth?


MIGRATIONS: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

The hope of jobs elsewhere: pulling economic migrants


Tertiary-educated people have the highest migration rates. More than half of the tertiary-educated population in Cabo Verde (67%), Gambia (63%), Mauritius (56%), Seychelles (56%) and Sierra Leone (52%)

and between a third and a half of the tertiary-educated population in Ghana (50%), Mozambique (45%), Liberia (45%), Kenya (38%) and Uganda (35%) leave their country.

Highly-skilled labour emigration, % of highly-skilled native labour force




Highly-skilled immigration, % of highly-skilled labour force



Pushed to escape: refugees & displaced persons

Persons of concern (2006-2015)



- On average Africa has accounted for a third (33%) of the global "persons of concern" over the past decade, reaching a high in 2011 of 38%.
- The clear majority of these remain in Africa. The percentage of African persons of concern being hosted in Africa has not dropped below 93% between 2006-2015.
- In comparison, an average of only 3% of African persons of concern are hosted in Europe. This is just over half a million people, and 1% of the global total persons of concern.

Africa as host

- In 2015, South Sudan featured as a source of refugees in four of the five African countries which host the greatest number of refugees.
- In the first six months of 2016, four African countries were in the global top ten countries hosting the greatest numbers of refugees: Ethiopia (5th), Kenya (7th), Uganda (8th) and Chad (10th).

Hosting Country	Number of refugees in 2015	Top 5 origin countries for refugees				
		1	2	3	4	5
Ethiopia	734,974	South Sudan	Somalia	Eritrea	Sudan	Kenya
Kenya	553,850	Somalia	South Sudan	Ethiopia	DRC	Sudan
Uganda	477,026	DRC	South Sudan	Somalia	Burundi	Rwanda
DRC	383,078	Rwanda	CAR	Burundi	South Sudan	Congo
Chad	369,517	Sudan	CAR	Nigeria	Niger	DRC

2015 UNHCR, 2016 MYSR

01_What Prospects for Africa's Youth?

MIGRATIONS: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

Migration within countries – internally displaced people

- Refugees and asylum seekers allow a perspective on migration outside of a country's borders. However, in most cases the volume of "internally displaced people" (IDPs) within a country will be larger than refugees and asylum seekers.
- Together these elements form the major parts of the "population of concern". The population of concern originating from South Sudan stood at 2.8 million people in mid-2016.
- The five countries producing the greatest populations of concern in Africa in 2016 are Sudan, South Sudan, Nigeria, DRC and Somalia.
- In three of these five countries around three quarters of these populations of concern are formed by internally displaced people within the country: Sudan (82%), Nigeria (78%) and DRC (72%).
- In the preceding decade (2006-2015), Nigeria's population of concern has increased by 2.3 million people.
- This is an increase of 10964% since 2006. This is the third highest increase over the decade. Libya and Niger are greater in percentage terms – with 19808% and 16024% respectively.

African countries producing the most persons of concern in 2016 (first six months)

	Sudan	South Sudan	Nigeria	DRC	Somalia
Refugees and people in refugee-like situations	638,986	854,172	181,294	536,074	6,074
Asylum seekers	45,678	4,408	57,897	78,090	78,090
Internally Displaced People (including people in IDP-like situations)	3,218,234	905,000	2,087,336	1,722,082	1,722,082
Returned IDPs	-	1,061,226	331,152	43,000	43,000
Returned refugees	32,526	18	17,293	19	19
Others of concern	12	-	20	8,796	8,796
Total persons of concern	3,935,436	2,824,824	2,674,992	2,388,061	2,388,061

Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, and others of concern by origin, mid-2016, UNHCR

Migration across borders – refugees

- The most recent UN data estimate new displacement of 3.2 million people worldwide in the first half of 2016. This is likely to underestimate the additional volume of displacement as it does not include any increase from Iraq or Syria.
- The impact of the Syrian crisis is firstly experienced in proximate countries. In mid-2016 Egypt hosted 117,200 Syrian refugees, nearly double that of Sweden (63,700).
- In the first half of 2016, the greatest percentage increase in refugee population was not seen in Syria but in South Sudan. The South Sudanese refugee population increased by 10%, whilst the Syrian refugee population grew by 9%.
- Albeit a smaller number of people than Syria, this is an increase of 75,452 people in six months alone.
- South Sudan's neighbours, which are less developed than Syria's, are feeling the brunt of the increase in refugees. By June 2016 Ethiopia hosted 287,500 South Sudan refugees, Sudan 232,200 and Uganda 228,300.

Lake Chad basin crisis

- Although the IDPs in Nigeria decreased slightly by 4% in the first 6 months of 2016, the effects of the security crisis in the Lake Chad basin can be seen in the surrounding countries, especially Cameroon and Chad where the IDPs increased by 106% and 42% respectively.

Country	Population in 2016	Internally displaced people as a percentage of the population
Somalia	11,079,013	10.2%
CAR	4,998,493	7.8%
Sudan	41,175,541	7.8%
South Sudan	12,733,427	7.1%
Libya	6,330,159	4.5%

CLIMATE CHANGE DISRUPTIONS

Timeline of initiatives

2009

In Africa, climate change issues are addressed at the highest political level through the **Committee of African Heads of States and Governments on Climate Change (CAHOSCC)** established by the African Union. In this context, CAHOSCC adopted in 2014 the high-level framework “Work Programme on Climate Change Action in Africa” (WPCAA) that covers five priority areas including: i) Climate financing and addressing technology needs; ii) Africa-wide programme on Adaptation; iii) Actions on Mitigation; iv) Cross-cutting actions and participation.

2010

The **Climate for Development in Africa Programme (ClimDev-Africa)** is a joint initiative implemented by the African Development Bank, the African Union Commission and UNECA. The overarching goal of the ClimDev-Africa Programme is to seek ways of overcoming the lack of necessary climate information, analysis and options required by policy and decision-makers at all levels.

2010

The **African Group of Negotiators (AGN)** consists of climate change negotiators of every African country, chaired by one country selected for a period of two years. AGN gets its direction from the African Ministers of Environment (AMCEN), the CAHOSCC and the African Union Assembly.

2012

The **West African Science Service Centre on Climate Change and Adapted Land Use (WASCAL)** is a large-scale research-focused Climate Service Centre designed to help tackle this challenge and thereby enhance the resilience of human and environmental systems to climate change and increased variability. It does so by strengthening the research infrastructure and capacity in West Africa related to climate change and by pooling the expertise of ten West African countries and Germany.

2012

The **African Risk Capacity (ARC)** was established as a Specialized Agency of the African Union to help Member States improve their capacities to better plan, prepare and respond to extreme weather events and natural disasters and to ensure food security. The ARC uses the Africa RiskView, an advanced satellite weather surveillance and software to estimate and trigger readily available funds to African countries hit by severe weather events.

2015

The **Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI)** commits to accelerating access to renewable energy in Africa and developing countries in other regions with a view to reducing energy poverty and mobilising substantial financial resources from private investors, development finance institutions and multilateral development banks by 2020.

2015

Launched at COP21 in Paris, the **Africa Climate Change Initiative** aims at providing support to African countries to enhance adaptation action and address loss and damage on the continent.

2016

The **Southern African Regional Universities Association Programme for Climate Change Capacity Development (PCCCCD)** is a consortium of seven universities from five SADC countries which have developed a regional Master’s curriculum in Climate Change and Sustainable Development.

01_What Prospects for Africa's Youth?

CLIMATE CHANGE DISRUPTIONS

Multiple & cumulative risks

- Africa is expected to be one of the continents hardest hit by climate change. It is expected to warm around 1.5 times faster than the global average.
- Multiple climate extremes such as drought, rising sea levels and flooding will become more frequent.
- The economic cost of these impacts is estimated to be about \$45-50 billion per year by 2040, and up to 7% of Africa's GDP on average by 2100.


BBC; UNECA

Sea level rises

- Projections of global sea level rise by 2100 range from 0.2 metres to 2.0 metres. Rising sea levels create higher risks of flooding, erosion, storm surges and intense rainstorms.
- More than 25% of Africa's population live within 100 km of the coastal zone and the continent has close to 320 coastal cities.
- In Nigeria, about 20 million people, almost a quarter of the national population, live along the coastal zone.
- In Senegal, about 4.5 million people, two thirds of the national population, live in the Dakar coastal area. About 90% of the industries in Senegal are located within the Dakar coastal zone.

IPS; IPCC; GCI; The Guardian

African land at risk of flooding



Droughts, water stress & famine

- Global warming of 2°C would put over 50% of the continent's population at risk of undernourishment.
- Between 1.5°C-2°C warming, drought and aridity will contribute to farmers losing 40-80% of cropland conducive to growing maize, millet, and sorghum by the 2030s-2040s.
- By 2020, between 75 and 250 million people in Africa are projected to be exposed to increased water stress due to climate change.

IPS; IPCC; GCI; The Guardian

Drought & desertification


Current drought in Eastern Africa

In Ethiopia, 5.6 million people are in urgent need of food and 9.2 million people are expected not to have a regular supply of safe drinking water.

In Somalia, the number of people in need of emergency food aid has doubled in the last six months to 6.2 million. Over 360,000 acutely malnourished children are in urgent need of support.

Oxfam

African land at risk of drought



01_What Prospects for Africa's Youth?

CLIMATE CHANGE DISRUPTIONS

Towards a continental response

Climate change and human security: migrations and conflicts

The number of floods, droughts and storms has devastating effects on vulnerable communities. In 2008, 20 million people were displaced by extreme weather events, compared to 4.6 million internally displaced by conflict and violence over the same period.

By 2050, it is estimated that about 200 million environment migrants will be moving internally or externally.

Global warming may also lead to armed conflicts. The six-year-old conflict in Sudan's Darfur region is an example where environmental pressures morphed into war, and the drylands of East Africa and the Middle East are also vulnerable to added stresses from global warming.

Oxfam

The United Nations climate change conferences: towards COP 23

- The Paris Agreement negotiated at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 21), aims to keep the global average temperature increase to well below 1.5°C, foster climate resilience and ensure finance flows for climate-resilient development. The agreement has been signed by all 54 African countries and already ratified by 35.
- Assuming international efforts keep global warming below 2°C, Africa could face climate change adaptation costs of \$50 billion per year by 2050.
- Africa, currently the most exposed region to climate change, has only been able to access less than 4% of global climate financing due to a lack of bankable projects on the continent.
- At COP22 in Marrakech in November 2016, developed nations committed to mobilise the finance goal of \$100 billion for developing countries.

Clim-Dev Africa; IPS; UNEP; UNFCCC

Climate financing issues in Africa

- Ensuring full implementation of existing finance;
- Avoid shifting of responsibility towards the private sector or to developing countries under the new agreement;
- The need for a clear pathway for finance between now and 2020 (the end of the Kyoto Protocol);
- Capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund and easing access to the funds;
- Ensuring finance to enable the preparation of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions by developing countries.

Clim-Dev Africa

SPOTLIGHT | CLEAN ENERGY: THE POTENTIAL TO LEAPFROG

Africa has an opportunity to "leapfrog" to modern, energy efficient technologies, since the continent has a rich portfolio of clean energy assets, including about 1,100 gigawatts of solar capacity, more than enough to meet total energy demand.

Modern renewable technology options (hydropower, wind energy, concentrating solar power, geothermal sources, solar photovoltaics) account for 5% of Africa's total final energy consumption. This could be increased to 22% in 2030.

- Kenya's Rift Valley region has a potential of producing 10,000 megawatts of geothermal energy, with the country tapping only 10% of it.
- Noor 1, Morocco's solar power plant at the town of Ouarzazate, which now provides 160 megawatts (MW) of the ultimate 580MW capacity, helping the country to save hundreds of thousands of tonnes of carbon emissions per year.

The transformation to clean energy would require on average \$70 billion per year of investment between 2015 and 2030. Within that total, about \$45 billion would be for generation capacity and about \$25 billion would be for transmission and distribution infrastructure.

Clim-Dev Africa

02 _

Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge

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End poverty in all its forms everywhere.



Reduce inequality within and among countries.



Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies.



Revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development.

02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge

SPOTLIGHT | "TERRORISM": NO COMMON DEFINITION, NO COMMON LIST

Terrorism originated as a linguistic, political term with various connotations, depending on whether it was being used by a perpetrator or a victim. "Terror" comes from the Latin *terrere*, which means "frighten" or "tremble".

1790s

The term "terrorism" originated during the French Revolution (1793-1794). It was used initially in a positive sense by a group of rebels (the Jacobins) as a self-reflexive portrayal of their own actions in, and explanations of, the French Revolution. The French politician Robespierre said at the time that "*terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible*". However, once the radical faction turned against its leader it accused him of *terrorisme*, lending a negative connotation to the word.

1798s

The word "terrorism" was first recorded in English-language dictionaries in 1798 as meaning "systematic use of terror as a policy".

1930s

An international attempt to define terrorism was started by the League of Nations following the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia in Marseille in 1934. A League of Nations Convention on the prevention and punishment of terrorism was signed in 1937 (but never entered into force), defining terrorism as "criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public".

1960s and 1970s

The definition of terrorism became more complex with the emergence of new nationalists and ethnic separatist groups. In 1972, the UN General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism after the attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. The UN attempted to agree on a definition for terrorism but it was not until 1979 that the Ad Hoc Committee adopted a resolution laying out the general approach towards international terrorism.

Fine, J.; Herschinger, E.; League of Nations; Olympics; UN

UN difficulties with defining terrorism

The UN General Assembly has made repeated attempts to define terrorism, without success due to three main issues:

1

One person's freedom fighter is another person's terrorist. People under foreign occupation have the right to resist and defining terrorism is complicated by this.

In 1987-8, the African National Congress party in South Africa (ANC) was labelled by the UK and US governments as "terrorist".

2

Is the reliance on terror the main factor to distinguish a movement from its political opponents?

3

Even if certain terrorist methods are employed by a movement, is "terrorist" an accurate description of the movement as a whole?

Ramsay, G.; Roberts, A.

UNITED NATIONS (UN) - DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (NOT APPROVED) (1996)

Any person committing, attempting to commit, making a credible and serious threat to commit, or participating or organising the following offenses:

- Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
- Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or to the environment; or
- Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of the present article resulting or likely to result in major economic loss; when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act.

EUROPEAN UNION COUNCIL (EU) FRAMEWORK DECISION 2002/475/JHA OF 13 JUNE 2002 ON COMBATING TERRORISM

- a. Attacks upon a person's life which may cause death;
- b. Attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
- c. Kidnapping or hostage taking;
- d. Causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
- e. Seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
- f. Manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development, of biological and chemical weapons;
- g. Release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life;
- h. Interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life,
- i. Threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h).

EU

ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF TERRORISM (1999)

Any act which "may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:

- a. intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
- b. disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
- c. create general insurrection in a State."

OAU

ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (OIC) CONVENTION ON COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (1999)

Any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorising people or threatening to harm them or imperilling their lives, honour, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States.

OIC

THE ARAB CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM (1998)

"Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs for the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda, causing terror among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or aiming to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupy or to seize them, or aiming to jeopardise a national resource."

"Terrorist" movements: no common list

	UN	EU	US	UK	Russia	UAE	New Zealand	Australia	Canada
Al-Shabaab	x		x	x		x	x	x	x
Ansar al-Sharia	x		x	x		x	x		x
Ansaru	x		x	x			x		
AQIM	x		x		x	x	x	x	x
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	x			x					x
Boko Haram	x		x	x		x	x	x	x
MUJAO	x						x		x

- Muslim Brotherhood is defined as a "terrorist organisation" by Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and UAE.

Australian Government, Emirates News Agency, EU, Government of Canada, New Zealand Police, Russian Federation NAC, UK Home Office, UN, US State Department.

02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge


GROWTH OVER A DECADE (2006-2015)

Spreading & intensifying

- Since 2006, terrorist attacks on the continent have increased by over 1,000%, with a sharp rise between 2013 and 2014.


Total number of terrorist events

Number of terrorism events




Terrorist attacks: concentration & intensity

2012




2013



Low —●—●—●—●— High

Intensity value is a combination of incident fatalities and injuries

Countries with the most fatalities (2006-2015)




Global Terrorism Database (GTD): definition of terrorism & inclusion criteria

The most comprehensive and accurate available data on terrorism are issued from the GTD from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), based at the University of Maryland. The GTD defines terrorism as follows:


A terrorist attack is the “threatened or use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation”. In practice this means that to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following criteria must be present:

- The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
- The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence – including property violence, as well as violence against people.
- The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.

2014



2015




02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge

GROWTH OVER A DECADE (2006-2015)

Multiple targets: victims & methods


- Ordinary citizens remain the biggest victims of terrorist attacks and are increasingly targeted, with 35.8% of all attacks in 2015 targeting civilians and their property.
- Attacks on private citizens and property soared from 71 in 2006 to 1,107 in 2015.
- Attacks on military and government targets have increased, with the percentage of attacks on foreign governments more than doubling.

Primary targets of terrorists in Africa



- Tactics remain largely focused on armed assault and bombings, indicating a preference for mass civilian casualties.

Main attack types in Africa



Identification: a complex task

According to the GTD, these groups have carried out the most “terrorist attacks” or caused the most fatalities, 2006–2015*.

GIA Armed Islamic Group

Attacks: 149
Deaths caused: 94
Location: Algeria

Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)

Attacks: 96
Deaths caused: 668
Location: DRC, Uganda

Al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam Brigade

Attacks: 11
Deaths caused: 117
Location: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Attacks: 237
Deaths caused: 786
Location: Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia

Al-Shabaab

Attacks: 2127
Deaths caused: 5804
Location: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda

Ansar al-Sharia (Libya)

Attacks: 62
Deaths caused: 117
Location: Libya

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Ansar Jerusalem)

Attacks: 61
Deaths caused: 203
Location: Egypt

Anti-Balaka Militia

Attacks: 53
Deaths caused: 430
Location: Cameroon, Central African Republic

Barqa Province of the Islamic State

Attacks: 89
Deaths caused: 215
Location: Libya

Boko Haram

Attacks: 1,839
Deaths caused: 17,093
Location: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria

David Yau Yau Militia

Attacks: 6
Deaths caused: 218
Location: South Sudan

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)

Attacks: 70

Deaths caused: 373
Location: DRC, Rwanda

Fulani Militants

Attacks: 277
Deaths caused: 1,908
Location: Central African Republic, Mali, Nigeria

Haftar Militia

Attacks: 25
Deaths caused: 101
Location: Libya

Janjaweed

Attacks: 170
Deaths caused: 410
Location: Chad, Sudan

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

Attacks: 18
Deaths caused: 261
Location: Chad, Sudan

Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

Attacks: 144
Deaths caused: 1,259
Location: Central African Republic, DRC, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda

M23

Attacks: 8
Deaths caused: 177
Location: DRC

Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

Attacks: 50
Deaths caused: 141
Location: Algeria, Mali, Niger

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)

Attacks: 83
Deaths caused: 290
Location: Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria

Muslim Fundamentalists

Attacks: 226
Deaths caused: 205
Location: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Africa, Tunisia

Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)

Attacks: 5
Deaths caused: 134
Location: Ethiopia, Somalia

Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)

Attacks: 69
Deaths caused: 119
Location: Algeria

Seleka

Attacks: 32
Deaths caused: 398
Location: Cameroon, Central African Republic

Sinai Province of the Islamic State

Attacks: 171
Deaths caused: 623
Location: Egypt

Sudan People's Liberation Movement - North

Attacks: 52
Deaths caused: 513
Location: Sudan

Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO)

Attacks: 42
Deaths caused: 861
Location: South Sudan

Tripoli Province of the Islamic State

Attacks: 144
Deaths caused: 184
Location: Libya, Tunisia

Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD)

Attacks: 3
Deaths caused: 103
Location: Chad

To consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following criteria must be present:

- The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
- The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence – including property violence, as well as violence against people.
- The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.

START

* Groups that have caused 100 or more fatalities or attacks.


02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge

GROWTH OVER A DECADE (2006-2015)

The "spaghetti bowl": subsidiaries, splinters, mergers

- One of the difficulties in identifying and classifying terrorist groups is their constant evolution, through splinter groups, mergers and subsidiaries. This has sometimes been referred to as a "spaghetti bowl".

Constant dynamic: some examples



**Boko Haram
(Islamic State West
Africa Province
since 2015)**

Created in 2002 in
northeast Nigeria.

Aims: implementation
of strict Sharia law
and creation of an
Islamic state.

Pledged allegiance to
ISIL in 2015.

Suspected links with AQIM,
Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula.

CFR 2017(3); Independent

**Ansaru
(Al-Qaeda in the
Lands Beyond
the Sahel)**

Created in 2012 in
northeast Nigeria,
as a splinter group
of Boko Haram.

Linked to AQIM.

Al-Mourabitoun

Al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam
Brigade & MUJAO
merge to form Al-
Mourabitoun in 2013.

CEP 2017

**ISIL (Islamic State
of Iraq and the
Levant, "IS", "ISIS",
"Daech") and
known African
subsidiaries**

ISIL-SP (ISIL-Sinai
Province), formed in
2014, initially known as
Ansar Beit al-Maqdis.

ISIL-L (ISIL-Libya), active
since 2014, initially
with three "provinces":
Cyrenaica (Barqa),
Tripolitania, Fezzan.

02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge

GLOBAL TERRORIST "BUSINESS MODELS"

Requirements & resources: structures in place

- Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram are the two deadliest terrorist groups in Africa, having caused an estimated 5,804 and 17,093 deaths respectively over a decade (2006-2015). They are also the two richest terrorist groups on the continent and feature in the top ten richest groups in the world.
- Terrorist groups are becoming more professional and include financial management practices such as documenting revenue levels and sources, expenditure reporting and accounting.

FATF 2015



OPERATIONS

Operational expenditure includes purchase of weapons, travel to and from target locations, use of vehicles and other machinery, and facilities to plan the operations.

Over the decade 41.9% of the attacks on the continent were carried out with explosives or bombs and 40.6% were carried out with firearms, not including expensive weaponry.



HUMAN RESOURCES

Terrorist organisations require funding for human resources, including recruitment, training (weapons training, bomb-making, clandestine communication and ideology) and facilities.

Salaries are distributed not only for members but also for the families of the jailed or deceased. The distribution of salaries is an important recruitment motivation, as such groups draw their members mainly from disaffected youth, the unemployed, and more and more high school or university graduates.



ALTERNATIVE GOVERNMENT SERVICES

To undermine the credibility of legitimate governments and to build support within local populations, many terrorist groups establish or subsidise and finance social institutions that provide health, social and educational services.



MEDIA

Propaganda is a key part of recruitment and fundraising. It can involve the use of internet and social media, but also more expensive platforms such as radio and television outlets.

FATF 2015

- Benefiting from porous land and maritime borders, fragile rule of law and high corruption levels, the illegal smuggling of goods and people is an extremely important source of revenue for terrorist groups.
- Terrorist organisations in Africa rely on numerous sources of income. Donations funnelled through private individuals, "Politically Exposed Persons" (PEPs) and charities are large sources of funding.
- The illicit markets that affect Africa frequently originate or terminate on other continents. Purely local interventions are inadequate to resolve the underlying problem.

FATF 2013

Top ten richest terrorist organisations globally (2014)		Annual turnover, \$ million
1	ISIS	2,000
2	Hamas	1,000
3	FARC	600
4	Hezbollah	500
5	Taliban	400
6	Al-Qaeda	150
7	Lashkar-e-Taiba	100
8	Al-Shabaab	70
9	Real IRA	50
10	Boko Haram	25

Forbes

Al-Shabaab use of social media

Al-Shabaab has distinguished itself as one of the most sophisticated jihadi users of communication technology. In its early years, it effectively used Internet chat rooms, websites, and YouTube videos to recruit and fundraise internationally.

Al-Shabaab's use of Twitter since 2011 has attracted more attention than its use of any other social media, in part because of the novelty of the group tweeting in real time about its terrorist attack on Nairobi's Westgate Mall in September 2013.

To increase its grip on communication, the group has also aggressively sought to ban or control use of communication technology inside Somalia over the past five years.

Menkhaus, K

ISIL use of social media

ISIL's use of social media has been described as "probably more sophisticated than that of most US companies". It regularly uses social media, particularly Twitter, to distribute its messages. The group uses the encrypted instant messaging service Telegram to disseminate images, videos and updates.

FT, IPT

Illicit trade & donations: diversified funding

Donations

- Funding through Islamic donations (e.g. Zakat¹) continues to be one of the methods used by designated terrorist groups operating in West and Central Africa. This method requires little infrastructure and is profitable because it manipulates a common practice of the Muslim population in the area.
- The use of these donations to support violent extremism is often unknown to the donating population. Regional authorities are unable to control or monitor these movements of money, which commonly comprise small amounts of cash.
- Supporters of extremist groups also knowingly and wilfully finance the activities of the organisation with donations. For example, Niger has observed the collection of cash contributions from traders or businessmen who are sympathisers or members of terrorist groups.
- Voluntary contributions also come from supporters abroad. For instance, AQIM receives donations from supporters in Europe.

FATF 2016

Illicit smuggling of tobacco, natural resources & wildlife

- Illicit tobacco, natural resources (coal, gas, timber and oil) and wildlife trade are primary sources of revenue for terrorist groups in Africa.
- The total value of illegal tobacco trade in north Africa is thought to exceed \$1 billion and is believed to have provided the bulk of financing for AQIM.
- It is estimated that terrorist groups may gain \$111-289 million annually from illicit taxing of charcoal, which appears to be one of Al-Shabaab's primary income sources (estimated annual total of \$38–56 million).
- Groups such as Niger Delta militants may be linked with oil theft in Nigeria. In 2013, 100,000 barrels per day were estimated to be stolen from facilities by organised crime groups, which at 2013 prices represented above \$11 million per day². There is a high risk that the proceeds of such operations go to extremist groups such as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta.
- The annual income from ivory to militias in the entire sub-Saharan region is estimated to be in the order of \$4.0-12.2 million. Groups such as the LRA and the Janjaweed primarily benefit from wildlife smuggling.

Central Bank of Nigeria; Chatham House; The Guardian; UNEP

¹ The compulsory giving of a set proportion of one's wealth to charity.

² This value was calculated obtaining the average crude oil price in 2013 from the Central Bank of Nigeria.


02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge

GLOBAL TERRORIST "BUSINESS MODELS"

Drugs: a global chain

- Drug trafficking, coming through both West and East Africa, is a major source of funding for terrorist groups: at least 50 tonnes of cocaine are transiting West Africa every year. The volume of heroin confiscated in West and East Africa was 674kg in 2012.
- Drugs, namely cocaine and heroin, are smuggled from West and East Africa to Europe, the US and Asia through mules, shipments or overland across the Sahara.
- Terrorist groups in Africa are either directly involved in drug trafficking, as AQIM is, or prosper by offering protection to smugglers who guard the traditional long-distance trading routes northward to the Mediterranean, as Boko Haram does.

Napoleoni, L.; Rotberg, R.; UNODC 2015, 2017



MIF based on: UNEP, UNODC 2015(2)

The West Africa Commission on Drugs (WACD)

The Kofi Annan Foundation took the lead in setting up the WACD. The Commission includes 11 regional leaders from the political world, civil society, the health sector, security and law enforcement, and the judiciary. It is chaired by Olusegun Obasanjo, former President of Nigeria, and includes Pedro Pires, former President of Cabo Verde and Ibrahim Laureate.

In 2014, the WACD launched the report “Not Just in Transit: Drugs, the State and Society in West Africa”. Its main conclusions and recommendations are the following.

Conclusions

- West Africa is no longer only a transit zone for drugs. Drugs are having a profound and disturbing effect on the stability of countries in the region and their development prospects;
- West Africa is ill prepared for this assault on its societies. Institutions of governance and justice are still quite fragile and vulnerable to penetration by organised crime and drug money;
- Illicit drugs are an international problem that cannot be solved by West Africa alone;
- Health systems in the region do not have the means or capacity to offer adequate prevention, treatment or harm reduction services to drug users.

Recommendations

- Treat drug use as a public health issue, rather than as a criminal justice matter;
- Confront openly the political and governance weaknesses, which traffickers exploit;
- Reform drug laws on the basis of existing and emerging minimum health standards and pursue decriminalisation of drug use and low-level, non-violent drug offences;
- Strengthen law enforcement for more selective deterrence, focusing on high-level targets;
- Avoid the militarisation of drug policy and related counter-trafficking measures of the kind that some countries have applied at great cost without reducing drug supply;
- Intensify cooperation between producing, transit and consuming countries not only on interdiction but also on prevention, treatment and harm reduction.

02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge


GLOBAL TERRORIST "BUSINESS MODELS"

Smuggling migrants: exploiting people

- Revenue from human smuggling is increasingly used to finance terrorist activity. This is particularly true for groups such as AQIM, who have some territorial control of the Sahel.
- Some 55,000 migrants are thought to be smuggled from East, North and West Africa into Europe every year, generating around \$150 million in revenue for criminals.
- Smugglers typically charge each migrant between \$800 and \$1,000 to reach Libya, and then between \$1,500 and \$1,900 to cross the Mediterranean to Europe.
- In 2015, over 220 smugglers were identified by Europol as being involved in more than one crime. 22% of the suspected migrant smugglers were linked to drug trafficking, 20% to trafficking in human beings and 20% to property crime.
- The smuggling market becomes more lucrative when the activity is illegal and risks are high. Within West Africa, the freedom of movement granted by ECOWAS gives less incentive to smuggling of migrants.
- Major hubs for migrant smuggling typically register low or around average scores in the sub-category *Rule of Law* and for the indicator *Corruption in Government & Public Officials* in the 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). Where improvements in trends in these measures are observed, these are small.
- Smuggling is dependent on corruption. Corrupt public officials, such as border and port authorities, soldiers, immigration officials, embassy and consulate employees are paid to ignore or to facilitate the process.

Europol and INTERPOL; Napoleoni, L; TIME; UNODC 2011, 2017

Migration routes across Africa



IOM

Rule of Law (2016 IIAG)

Hubs for migrant smuggling	Score/100	Change since 2006
Libya	16.1	-22.1
Algeria	42.8	-14.2
Mali	54.6	-6.1
Morocco	55.8	+0.5
Egypt	63.6	+2.2
Niger	54.6	+2.8
Sudan	23.5	+3.2
Burkina Faso	54.2	+3.4

Highlighted on map above.

Corruption in Government & Public Officials (2016 IIAG)

Hubs for migrant smuggling	Score/100	Change since 2006
Mali	40.0	-20.0
Sudan	0.0	-10.0
Burkina Faso	35.0	-5.0
Morocco	40.0	No change
Algeria	40.0	No change
Egypt	40.0	No change
Niger	40.0	No change
Libya	5.0	+5.0


MIF

Kidnapping: lucrative ransoms


- Kidnapping for ransom (KFR) is a growing primary source of revenue for terrorist groups, including Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and AQIM, and paid ransoms are reported to range from \$630,000 to \$8.4 million per ransom.
- In the last decade, kidnapping events on the continent grew by more than 1,000%, with an increase of more than 330% from 2013 to 2014. In parallel, the number of ransoms demanded has increased by more than 130% in the past decade, with a spike of 275% from 2013 to 2014.

Europol and INTERPOL; FATF; START; UNODC


Percentage increase/decrease in KFR, Africa



Number of incidents where victims were kidnapped or taken hostage



Share of kidnappings per group (2006-2015)



- Nigeria, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and the DRC are the top five countries on the continent for the number of incidents where groups kidnapped or took hostages.
- The groups that have most frequently used kidnapping and hostage taking as a tactic over the last decade are the LRA, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Janjaweed, the Tripoli Province of the Islamic State, AQIM and the Fulani Militants.

02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge

GLOBAL TERRORIST "BUSINESS MODELS"

Moving funds: many vehicles

- Accurate data on Illicit Financial Flows (IFF) are limited, however IFFs from Africa could be as much as \$50 billion per annum. This is approximately double the official development assistance (ODA) that Africa receives.
- IFFs can be moved in smuggled cash, through intermediaries such as Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs), trade, Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) or via transfer systems.
- Cash, including foreign currency and Money Value Transfer Systems (MVTs), are the most common means of transfer.

FATF 2016; UNECA

Smuggling cash

- Weak security at porous national borders, ports and checkpoints are exploited by terrorist groups to smuggle cash and small arms. This is exacerbated by a lack of domestic inter-agency co-ordination and collaboration, cross border co-operation, and the existence of informal and unregulated economies.
- The existence of trafficking routes, such as AQIM's in West Africa, is also benefitting the smuggling of cash.
- Lack of effective currency declaration systems at borders, the prevalence of informal and unregulated economies, and the predominance of cash transactions in regions like West Africa are also contributing to the situation.
- Terrorist organisations are also exploiting Islamic tenets that forbid men from having any physical contact with women they are not married to, by using women as cash and weapon couriers in Islam-dominated areas.

FATF 2013, 2015, 2016

Transferring cash through the banking sector

- Because of its size and scope, the international banking sector is vulnerable to terrorist groups that blend in with normal financial activity, often through small-scale transactions.
- More complex methods have used accounts of both legitimate and shell businesses with an international presence.
- To overcome anti-money laundering (AML) regulations, traditional products can be abused. For example, sympathisers of a terrorist group open savings accounts and provide the debit card associated with the account to a member of the terrorist organisation to enable them to access cash via withdrawals from overseas bank ATMs.
- This has been observed in cases involving PEPs and charity/NGOs. In some instances, terrorists use proxy accounts to transfer funds to their members. Most often, these funds are withdrawn using ATMs.

FATF 2013, 2015

Using money value transfer systems (MVTs)

- The remittance sector has been exploited by terrorist groups, especially in conflict-prone countries where access to banking services is limited.
- Migrant communities and families rely heavily on MVTs to remit funds home. This not only provides a channel for mixing terrorist financing with legitimate transfers, it also makes it difficult to distinguish terrorist activity from normal family and community transfers.
- This is compounded by agents or employees who facilitate transfers on behalf of terrorist groups, including the faking of transaction reporting to confuse or anonymise details.

FATF 2013

Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs)

- Compromised NGOs/charities use the cover of humanitarian work to avoid detection by serving as a conduit for moving funds to terrorists and/or terrorist organisations under the guise of legitimate and charitable operations.
- NGOs and charities are particularly vulnerable to terrorist financing because of their potential role as conduits for moving funds to the various locations in which they operate, including conflict zones and areas where there are a low levels of governance. NPOs may also have exposure to many beneficiaries, some of whom may be vulnerable to radicalisation.

FATF 2013

Laundering money

- Terrorist organisations use innovative ways to make use of legitimate trade transactions, both small and large scale, to launder money and to collect and transfer funds.

FATF 2013

Innovative methods

- Terrorist groups are continually finding new and innovative ways to move money to finance terrorist activities.
- New avenues of moving money that pose large risks include digital currency such as bitcoin. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has already warned against the possibility of exploitation of digital currency by criminals and terrorists on the continent. With transactions "largely untraceable and anonymous", CBN claims virtual currency transactions are "susceptible to abuse by criminals, especially in money laundering and financing of terrorism".

Quartz Africa

Case studies

Cash couriers & arms smugglers in Burkina Faso & Nigeria

Two individuals from Niger were apprehended at the Burkina-Niger border while on their way to Nigeria. Both were in possession of weapons, ammunition (about 80,000 cartridges), and almost \$13,000. These persons were charged with trafficking in weapons and ammunition. They disclosed that they had ties to Boko Haram. This case involved a private arms dealer in Burkina Faso who allegedly provided these without the approval of the authorities.

FATF 2013

Complicit agent in Somalia

An individual raised funds for Al-Shabaab from the Somali diaspora in the USA and used a variety of licensed money service businesses (MSBs) with offices in the United States to remit the money to Somalia for general support of Al-Shabaab fighters. The co-conspirator, who worked for one of the MSBs involved, helped the individual avoid detection by structuring transactions into low dollar amounts and by using false identification information. The MSB worker and other conspirators used fictitious names and phone numbers to hide the nature of their transactions.

FATF 2015

Abuse of NGO/charity sector in Nigeria

ZT, an international NGO/charity organisation headquartered in the Middle East, sought to open an account in "Bank A" in Nigeria. While carrying out due diligence on ZT, Bank A discovered that the organisation and one of its directors had been indicted in a case involving terrorist financing in two countries. A Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) was immediately filed with the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU). Subsequent investigations established that ZT had operated in Nigeria for an extended period and had maintained multiple bank accounts in three different Nigerian banks. ZT was also affiliated with another NGO known to have supported terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda. Finally, it was established that ZT's charity operations supported Hamas, a Palestinian extremist organisation, and Gama'a al-Islamiyya, an Algerian terrorist group. The frequency of withdrawals from ZT accounts in the states known for Boko Haram activities also raised concerns about the ultimate use of these funds. The promoters of ZT claimed to be paying the salaries of itinerant Islamic clerics in Nigeria.

FATF 2013

Real estate fictitious companies in Senegal

"Mr M" is a Canadian citizen of Somali origin residing in Dakar. He established a real estate company, Company A in conjunction with "Mr D", a Senegalese citizen. An account was opened for Company A, at a bank in Senegal. Shortly afterwards, this account received a wire transfer of approximately \$106,000 from "Mr S", a Somali citizen based in the United States. A financial institution based in Dubai executed the transfer. Based on the suspicious circumstances of the transaction, including the country of origin of funds, lack of adequate information documenting the identity of the new customer, and the destination of the funds, Senegalese Bank APLHA filed a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) to the Senegalese FIU. "Mr M", "Mr D", and "Mr S" were in contact with extremist groups involved in terrorist activities in East Africa, North America, Europe, and Mauritania. "Mr M", "Mr D" and "Mr S" had also established a related company, Company B, together with other Senegalese nationals, to import used goods, some of which were sold locally and the remainder exported to a third country for re-sale. The proceeds of these sales were sent to a number of terrorist groups.

FATF 2013

02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge

FIGHTING TERRORISM: PARALLEL APPROACHES

The continental policy: slow moving



1992

Dakar, Senegal

Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States

During its 28th Ordinary Session, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted this resolution pledging to fight the phenomena of extremism and terrorism.



1994

Tunis, Tunisia

Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations

At its 30th Ordinary Session the OAU adopted this declaration, being the first time that African leaders explicitly described terrorism as a criminal act.



1999

Algiers, Algeria

Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism

Adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU Summit and entered into force in 2002, this Convention for the first time defined what constituted a terrorist attack. It criminalised terrorist acts under state's laws, defined areas of cooperation among states, and provided a legal framework for extradition as well as extra-territorial investigations and mutual legal assistance.



2001

Dakar, Senegal

Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism

Shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, this declaration was adopted by 27 Heads of States (Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia and Uganda). The protocol recognised the growing threat of terrorism and appealed to all African countries to ratify the 1999 Convention, to avoid that the "September 11, 2001 events and their consequences have an adverse impact on the development of Africa".



In 2016, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia and Uganda have still not ratified the 2004 Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention & Combating of Terrorism.

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

2002

Algiers, Algeria

The AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism


To give concrete expression to the commitments and obligations of Member States under the 1999 Convention, the AU High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa adopted the AU Plan of Action. The Plan of Action adopted practical counter-terrorism measures to fight the phenomena of extremism and terrorism.

2004

Algiers, Algeria

The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)

This centre was established to play an important role in guiding the AU's counter-terrorism efforts in collaboration with a number of regional and international partners to ensure coherent and coordinated counter-terrorism efforts on the continent.




2004

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism

This protocol mandated the AU's Peace and Security Council to monitor and facilitate implementation of the 1999 Convention, and encouraged RECs to take a more active role.



2010

Kampala, Uganda

Prevention and Combating of Terrorism

The AU Peace & Security Council highlighted the need for renewed efforts and increased mobilisation against terrorism, and called for Member States that had not done so to urgently sign and ratify the 1999 Convention and its Protocol



2011

Malabo, Equatorial Guinea

The African Model Anti-Terrorism Law

The Model Law was developed to assist Member States in implementing the provisions contained in the various continental and international counter-terrorism instruments.



02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge

FIGHTING TERRORISM: PARALLEL APPROACHES


The regional policies: under-resourced

The main issues

Lack of implementation

- The 2004 Protocol to the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, only entered into force ten years later in 2014 despite only requiring 15 states to ratify it.
- Key state actors in the fight against terrorism in Africa – including Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia and Uganda – have yet to ratify it, and the last country that did (Mauritania), did so in 2014.

Countries that have not ratified the 2004 Protocol



Lack of funding

- Apart from the legal instruments necessary to address terrorism, an international and continental response against terrorism requires financial cooperation. In 2014, at AU Head of State level Peace and Security Council (PSC) in Nairobi, Kenya highlighted the need for the AU Commission to establish a Counter Terrorism Fund.
- The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), established in 2004 to move efforts on the continent to address terrorism, remains chronically under-funded and under-staffed.

AU; ISS 2015, 2016; UNOAU

ECOWAS



Economic Community of West African States
15 member countries


Action: In 2013, ECOWAS put in place the Political Declaration on a Common Position Against Terrorism, which included a Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan, adopted by the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS at its 42nd ordinary session in Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire.

Goal: The principal purpose of the Declaration and Strategy is to prevent and eradicate terrorism and related criminal acts in West Africa, with a view to creating conditions conducive to sound economic development and ensuring the wellbeing of all ECOWAS citizens.

Strategy: Inspired by the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the strategy rests on three main pillars: prevent, pursue and reconstruct.

Features: ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit; an ECOWAS Arrest Warrant; and an ECOWAS Black List of Terrorist and Criminal Networks.

IGAD



Inter-governmental Authority on Development
8 member countries

Action: The IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) was launched in 2011 after the IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT), absorbing the best practices from the four years of ICPAT while at the same time addressing regional security matters.

Goal: To enhance and enable member states' security sector capacity to address common transnational security threats, thus engendering sustainable economic development; and contribute the prediction, anticipation, prevention, and management of emerging, evolving, and existing security threats in the IGAD region for sustainable development and economic integration.

Strategy: The ISSP's Counter Terrorism (CT) Pillar main goals and activities are geared towards building national and regional capacity of the Horn of Africa countries in the fight against terrorism, radicalisation and extremist violence. The ISSP works in partnership with regional and international organisations such as African Union (AU), Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF), Global Center for Cooperative Security (GCCS), Saharan Research and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) among others.

ISS

IGAD

SADC



Southern African Development Community
15 member countries

Action: In 2014 and 2015, experts from the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism (CAERT), United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT), SADC Organ Early Warnings Unit and from the 15 SADC Member States attended workshops to assess the threat of terrorism and violent extremism to the SADC region, prepared a draft regional counter terrorism strategy and developed a plan to implement it.

EAC



East African Community
5 member countries

Action: A Peace and Security Strategy was adopted in November 2006. Subsequently, the EAC adopted the Protocol on Peace and Security as well as the EAC Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism in 2012 at the EAC joint meeting of the sectoral councils on Cooperation in Defence, Inter-state Security and Foreign Policy Coordination.

Goal: The Protocol identified over 20 objectives for fostering regional peace and security, these include; combating terrorism and piracy; peace support operations; prevention of genocide; disaster management and crisis response; management of refugees; control of proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and combating transnational and cross-border crimes.

CEN-SAD



Community of Sahel-Saharan States
28 member countries

Action: In 2009, delegates from the CEN-SAD member states adopted the 2009 Sharm-el-Sheikh Declaration.

Goal: To reinforce cooperation including in the field of anti-terrorism and security.

Strategy: According to the agreement, member states have agreed on enhancing military, security, and intelligence strategies to combat terrorism, and limit the activities of extremist groups. For example, Egyptian military forces are permitted to participate in border protection with Libya and Sudan, as well as to share military intelligence concerning militant activities. Egypt is also allowed to communicate with countries combating extremist groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, in order to limit, and eventually halt, their activities. The final joint statement of the CEN-SAD countries entailed that a counter-terrorism centre will be established with its permanent headquarters in Egypt.

02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge

FIGHTING TERRORISM: PARALLEL APPROACHES

The UN policy: a unified response?

History

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy on 8 September 2006. All Member States have agreed for the first time to a common strategic and operational approach to fight terrorism, not only sending a clear message that terrorism is unacceptable in all its forms and manifestations but also resolving to take practical steps individually and collectively to prevent and combat it.

Structure

The General Assembly reviews the Strategy every two years, making it a living document attuned to Member States' counter-terrorism priorities. The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, in the form of a resolution and an annexed Plan of Action (A/RES/60/288), is composed of four pillars:

UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy



Pillar I

Addressing the Conditions Conducive to the Spread of Terrorism.

Pillar II

Preventing and Combating Terrorism.

Pillar III

Building State capacity and strengthening the role of the United Nations.

Pillar IV

Ensuring human rights and the rule of law.

International Crisis Group (ICG) analysis & recommendations

Military means alone will not root out underlying causes of violent extremism. In the Sahel, for example, armed jihadist groups have developed a dangerous new strategy after being chased out of most major towns in the vast expanse of arid, sparsely populated brushland that crosses the continent along the southern edge of the Sahara desert.

Rather than trying to hold towns or urban districts, these groups – which include Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, the Macina Liberation Front (FLM) and Al-Murabitoun – are using bases in the countryside to strike at provincial and district centres, often forcing national armies to retreat and local state authorities to abandon immense rural areas to jihadist control.

Furthermore, increased international support has had the side effect of reinforcing Sahelian countries' tendency to focus on the political centre whilst jihadists are establishing themselves among rural communities.

Rather than being satisfied with retaking control of towns, Sahelian governments and their partners must reflect on how best to respond to the new strategies used by the jihadists to establish themselves in rural areas and extend their influence. Governments must invest in neglected rural zones and communities that feel marginalised.

Jihadists and other violent non-state groups are filling the security vacuum as the army retreats and local authorities and the central government abandon immense rural areas.

In addition, the rise of a new group, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and the possible influx from Libya of defeated Islamic State (IS) fighters are further sources of concern.

Chronic resource limitations hobble Sahelian states' ability to respond effectively: Niger's state revenue, for example, is \$1.8 billion, about as much as France invested in stadiums to host the UEFA Euro 2016 football championship.

ICG 2017, 2017(2)

GOVERNANCE SHORTFALLS: KEY TRIGGERS

Terrorist "hubs" & weak governance

- The top ten worst performing African countries in the 2016 Global Terrorism Index (GTI)¹, Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt, Libya, Cameroon, Niger, DRC, Sudan, Kenya and CAR, score below the continental average for *Overall Governance* in the 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), except Egypt (1.0 point above the average), Niger (0.2 points above the average) and Kenya (8.9 points above the average).
- Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt and Libya are also in the GTI top ten countries registering the highest levels of terrorism in the world.
- Libya registers the highest increase in terrorism incidence on the continent (+6.937) since 2011, the first data year of the GTI. Libya also shows the largest deterioration in *Overall Governance* in the IIAG (-10.2) in the same period.
- According to the 2016 GTI, East Africa registered the highest average level of terrorism in 2015, mainly due to high terrorism scores in Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Central Africa registers the highest average increase in terrorism since 2011, mainly due to increases in Cameroon (+4.375) and Chad (+2.82).
- For the 50 African countries where there is a trend available, over half (26) show an increase in terrorism levels between 2011-2015. The number of African countries in the global top ten for highest terrorism levels has also doubled from two in 2011 (Somalia, Nigeria), to four in 2015 (Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt and Libya).


IEP 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016; MIF

2016 GTI & 2016 IIAG scores & ranks, top ten African countries with highest terrorism levels


	2016 GTI (score/10- higher is worse)	2016 GTI (global rank/130- higher is worse)	2016 IIAG Overall Governance (score/100.0- higher is better)	2016 IIAG (Africa rank/54- higher is worse)
African Average	2.83724		50.0	
Nigeria	9.314	3	46.5	36
Somalia	7.548	7	10.6	54
Egypt	7.328	9	51.0	24
Libya	7.283	10	29.0	51
Cameroon	7.002	13	45.7	38
Niger	6.682	16	50.2	27
DRC	6.633	17	35.8	46
Sudan	6.6	18	30.4	49
Kenya	6.578	19	58.9	12
CAR	6.518	20	25.7	52

IEP 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016; MIF

Terrorism incidence levels in 2015²



Terrorism incidence trends, 2011-2015²



¹ The Global Terrorism Index scores countries from 0 to 10 (higher is worse) and accounts for the direct and indirect impact of terrorism in terms of total number of incidents, total number of fatalities, total number of injuries, sum of property damages and the psychological effects of terrorism.

² Cabo Verde, Comoros, São Tomé & Príncipe and Seychelles are not included in the GTI. South Sudan and Togo were only included in 2013, thus the trend in terrorism levels is measured from 2013 to 2015.


02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge

GOVERNANCE SHORTFALLS: KEY TRIGGERS

Failing democratic participation

- Countries on the previous page perform below the African average in several indicators from the 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG).

2016 IIAG indicator scores, top ten African countries with highest terrorism levels & continental average score



IEP; MIF

- 59% of terror attacks worldwide in 2014 occurred in countries classified by Freedom House as "Not Free", more than in "Free" and "Partly Free" countries combined¹.
- For the ten African countries with the highest terrorism levels in the GTI² their average scores for democracy-related indicators in the 2016 IIAG are below the continental average scores for *Transfers of Power*, *Political Participation*, *Civil Society Participation*, *Free & Fair Elections*, *Legitimacy of Political Process*, *Freedom of Expression*, *Freedom of Association & Assembly*, *Civil Liberties* and *Human Rights Violations*.
- Somalia (54th out of 54), Sudan (51st), Libya (50th) and Egypt (46th) are amongst the ten worst performers in the IIAG's *Participation & Human Rights* category in 2015. They are also ranked as the 2nd, 8th, 4th and 3rd highest African countries in the GTI in terms of terrorism levels in 2015, respectively.
- Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt and Libya, the four countries with highest levels of terrorism on the continent in the GTI, all register a score of 0.0 in the IIAG *Human Rights Violations* indicator in 2015.

Freedom House, IEP, MIF

¹ Freedom House awards scores to a country's political rights and civil liberties to determine a rating of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom. Those whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered Free, 3.0 to 5.0 Partly Free, and 5.5 to 7.0 Not Free.

² Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt, Libya, Cameroon, Niger, DRC, Sudan, Kenya and CAR.

Social exclusion & poverty

- Terrorism is highest in countries that perform poorest in measures of social exclusion and have lack of social safety nets.
- The average score of the ten countries with the highest terrorism levels on the continent in the 2016 GTI is below the continental average score in the indicator *Social Exclusion* in the 2016 IIAG. While the continental average is a low 20.8 out of 100.0, the average score for these countries is 14.3.
- The average score of the ten countries with the highest terrorism levels on the continent in the 2016 GTI is below the continental average score in the indicator *Social Safety Nets* in the 2016 IIAG. While the continental average is 43.5 out of 100.0, the average score for these countries is 27.7.


IEP; MIF

The assumed link between terrorism & poverty?

The correlation between the 2016 GTI and the 2016 IIAG *Poverty* indicator is weak ($R=0.2$), suggesting that there is no significant relationship between poverty and terrorism. Additionally, the average of the top ten countries with the highest terrorism levels on the continent is 3.0 points higher than the continental average for the *Poverty* indicator.

IEP; MIF

2016 IIAG indicator scores, top ten African countries with the highest terrorism levels & continental average



■ Average score of the top ten countries with the highest terrorism levels
 ■ Continental average score

Score/100.0, higher is better

IEP; MIF

02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge


GOVERNANCE SHORTFALLS: KEY TRIGGERS

High levels of corruption

- Corruption facilitates terrorism:
 - Corrupt public officials facilitate the collection and movement of funds by terrorist groups.
 - State institutions weakened by corruption are less effective in fighting terrorism.
 - Extremist groups draw on deep public anger at the abuse of power to radicalise and recruit.
- The average scores of the ten African countries with the highest terrorism levels in the GTI register below the continental average scores in the IIAG indicators *Corruption in Government & Public Officials* and *Corruption & Bureaucracy*.
- While the African average in Transparency International's 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index is 31.0 out of 100.0, the ten African countries with the highest terrorism levels in the 2016 GTI average 22.8.

IEP; MIF; OECD; TI 2017, 2017(2)

2016 IIAG indicator scores, top ten African countries with highest terrorism levels & continental average score




■ Average score of the top ten countries with the highest terrorism levels
■ Continental average score
Score/100.0, higher is better
IEP; MIF

Rising domestic conflicts

Correlation between *Domestic Armed Conflict* & the Global Terrorism Index

2016 IIAG *Domestic Armed Conflict* scores




IEP; MIF

- There is a strong negative correlation (-0.8) between the 2016 GTI scores and the 2016 IIAG indicator *Domestic Armed Conflict*. As a high score in the GTI is worse and a high score in the IIAG is better, this negative correlation suggests that the more countries plunge into internal armed conflict, the higher terrorism levels are.
- The ten African countries with the highest terrorism levels on the continent average 17.5 out of 100.0 in the 2016 IIAG indicator *Domestic Armed Conflict*, 38.5 points below the African average (56.0).

IEP; MIF


2016 IIAG indicator scores, top ten African countries with highest terrorism levels & continental average score



- Globally, countries with higher levels of political terror, the existence of policies targeting religious freedoms and group grievances are more prone to terrorism.
- The ten worst performing countries in the 2016 GTI, on average, score below the continental average in the 2016 IIAG indicators *Police Services*, *Political Violence*, *Social Unrest* and *Safety of the Person*.

Correlation between *Political Violence* & the Global Terrorism Index

2016 IIAG *Political Violence* scores



- The *Political Violence* indicator in the IIAG measures state violence.
- The correlation between the 2016 GTI and the 2016 IIAG indicator *Political Violence* are strongly negative in 2013 (-0.8), 2014 (-0.7) and 2015 (-0.6). These negative correlations suggest that where there is a high level of violence committed against civilians by the state, there are also high levels of terrorism.

IEP; MIF

03 _

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11 SUSTAINABLE CITIES AND COMMUNITIES

Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.



16 PEACE, JUSTICE AND STRONG INSTITUTIONS

Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies.



17 PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE GOALS

Revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development.

03_African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

SPOTLIGHT | DEMOCRACY: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

"Demos" = people, neighbourhood

"Kratia" = power, force

In the Athenian democracy (4th and 5th century BCE) all male citizens over 18 years old (land-owners and non-slaves) had equal political rights, freedom of speech and the opportunity to participate directly in the political arena in this city-state. Citizens actively served in the institutions that governed them, and directly controlled all parts of the political process.

These concepts remain central to the various academic and institutional definitions of democracy.

- The UN's description of democracy is based on fundamental and universally accepted principles, including: participation, accountability, transparency, rule of law, separation of powers, access, subsidiarity, equality and freedom of the press.
- Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan: "Democracy is not just about one day every four or five years when elections are held, but a system of government that respects the separation of powers, fundamental freedoms like the freedom of thought, religion, expression, association and assembly and the rule of law... Any regime that rides roughshod on these principles loses its democratic legitimacy, regardless of whether it initially won an election."
- Amartya Sen: "We must not identify democracy with majority rule. Democracy has complex demands, which certainly include voting and respect for election results, but it also requires the protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for legal entitlements, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensored distribution of news and fair comment... Democracy is a demanding system, and not just a mechanical condition (like majority rule) taken in isolation."
- African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance: The consolidation of democracy is achieved with the promotion of democratic institutions, elections, participatory democracy, and through cooperation and exchange of experiences between the States Parties at regional and continental levels.
- Samuel Huntington: "Democracy is based on the level or extent of: open, free and fair elections; limitations on political power; institutionalisation and stability; and electoral competition and widespread voting participation."

- Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán: Democracy is "a regime (a) that sponsors free and fair competitive elections for the legislature and executive; (b) that allows for inclusive adult citizenships; (c) that protects civil liberties and political rights; and (d) in which the elected governments really govern and the military is under civilian control".
- Robert Dahl: Democracy means free and fair elections, freedom of expression, access to information, associational autonomy and inclusive citizenship.
- Larry Diamond: The minimum "thin" requirement for calling a system of governance democratic is the existence of regular, free and fair elections.

AU; Cartledge, P.; The Guardian; Mainwaring, S. & Brinks, D. & Pérez-Liñán, A.; Parrish, B.; Sen, K.A. 1997; Strand, H. & Hegre, H. & Gates, S. & Dahl, M.; UNPAN; Wanniarachchi, T.

"Democracy is not just about one day every four or five years when elections are held, but a system of government that respects the separation of powers, fundamental freedoms like the freedom of thought, religion, expression, association and assembly and the rule of law... Any regime that rides roughshod on these principles loses its democratic legitimacy, regardless of whether it initially won an election."

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

2006-2016: 109 elections, 44 changes of power



- In the past decade 96 direct and 13 indirect presidential elections took place in Africa resulting in 44 changes of power.
- 2011 and 2016 saw the most presidential elections (15) in the past decade.
- In 2016, eight elections led to a change of power.
- Zambia has had the most presidential elections (five) in the past decade.
- Two countries have not held any election since 2006: Eritrea and Libya.

The timeline portrays all direct elections that resulted in the election or nomination of the Head of State during the last decade. This includes executive elections, but also legislative elections where the Head of State is subsequently elected or nominated (Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Mauritius and South Africa).

Elections where the citizens did not directly vote have not been included.

03_African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Leaving office: 44 elections, 13 violent oustings, 9 deaths

Country	Pre-2006	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	
Algeria	Abdelaziz Bouteflika				Abdelaziz Bouteflika					
Angola	José Eduardo dos Santos							José Eduardo dos Santos		
Benin	Mathieu Kérékou	Boni Yayi					Boni Yayi			
Botswana	Festus Mogae				Ian Khama					
Burkina Faso	Blaise Compaoré					Blaise Compaoré				
Burundi	Pierre Nkurunziza					Pierre Nkurunziza				
Cabo Verde	Pedro Pires	Pedro Pires					Jorge Fonseca			
Cameroon	Paul Biya						Paul Biya			
CAR	François. Bozizé							♦	TG	
Chad	Idriss Deby	Idriss Deby					Idriss Deby			
Comoros	Azali Assoumani	Ahmed Abdallah Sambi					Ikililou Dhoinine			
Congo	Denis Sassou-Nguesso				Denis Sassou-Nguesso					
Côte d'Ivoire	Laurent Gbagbo					♦	Alassane Ouattara			
DRC	Joseph Kabila	Joseph Kabila					Joseph Kabila			
Djibouti	Ismail Omar Guelleh						Ismail Omar Guelleh			
Egypt	Mohamed Hosni Mubarak					♦	TG	Mohamed Morsi		
Equatorial Guinea	Teodoro Obiang				Teodoro Obiang					
Eritrea	Isaias Afewerki									
Ethiopia	Meles Zenawi					Meles Zenawi		♦	H. Desalegn	
Gabon	Omar Bongo Ondimba				♦	Ali Bongo Odimba				
Gambia	Yahya Jammeh	Yahya Jammeh					Yahya Jammeh			
Ghana	John Kufuor				John Atta Mills		♦	John Mahama		
Guinea	Lansana Conté				♦	TG	Alpha Condé			
Guinea-Bissau	João Bernardo Vieira				♦	Malam Bacai Sanhá		♦	TG	
Kenya	Mwai Kibaki		Mwai Kibaki					U. Kenyatta		
Lesotho	Pakalitha Mosisili		Pakalitha Mosisili					Tom Thabane		
Liberia	TG	Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf					Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf			
Libya	Muammar Gaddafi							♦	TG	
Madagascar	Marc Ravalomanana		Marc Ravalomanana			♦	TG			
Malawi	Bingu Wa Mutharika				Bingu Wa Mutharika		♦	Joyce Banda		
Mali	Amadou Toumani Touré		Amadou Toumani Touré			TG		♦	I. B. Keita	
Mauritania	TG		S.O. Cheikh Abdallani			♦	TG	Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz		
Mauritius	Navin Ramgoolam					Navin Ramgoolam				
Morocco	Driss Jettou		Abbas El Fassi				Abdel-Ilah Benkiran			
Mozambique	Armando Guebuza				Armando Guebuza					
Namibia	Hifikepunye Pohamba				Hifikepunye Pohamba					
Niger	Mamadou Tandja					♦	TG	Mahamadou Issoufou		
Nigeria	Olusegun Obasanjo		Umaru Yar'Adua			♦	Jonathan Goodluck			
Rwanda	Paul Kagame					Paul Kagame				
São Tomé & Príncipe	Fradique De Menezes	Fradique De Menezes					Manuel Pinto da Costa			
Senegal	Abdoulaye Wade		Abdoulaye Wade			Macky Sall				
Seychelles	James Michel	James Michel					James Michel			
Sierra Leone	Ahmad Tejan Kabbah		Ernest Bai Koroma					Ernest Bai Koroma		
Somalia	TG							A.M. Ali	A.F. Shirdon	
South Africa	Thabo Mbeki			Motlanthe	Jacob Zuma					
South Sudan	N.A.						Salva Kiir Mayardit			
Sudan	Omar Al-Bashir					Omar Al-Bashir				
Swaziland	Themba Dlamini			Barnabas Sibusiso Dlamini					B. S. Dlamini	
Tanzania	Jakaya Kikwete					Jakaya Kikwete				
Togo	Faure Gnassingbe					Faure Gnassingbe				
Tunisia	Zine El Abidine Ben Ali				Zine El Abidine Ben Ali		♦	TG		
Uganda	Yoweri Museveni	Yoweri Museveni					Yoweri Museveni			
Zambia	Levy Mwanawasa	Levy Mwanawasa	♦	Rupiah Banda			Michael Sata			
Zimbabwe	Robert Mugabe			Robert Mugabe					Robert Mugabe	

The year represented is the year when the mandate started, not the year the election took place. Interim and Acting Heads of State have not been included.
The leaders represented on the following countries are the Prime-Ministers: Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mauritius, Morocco, Somalia and Swaziland.

Bertelsmann Stiftung; Constitute Project; Freedom House; NDI; Psephos Adam Carr Election Archive

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
	Abdelaziz Bouteflika					Scheduled elections							
				Scheduled elections									
			Patrice Talon					Scheduled elections					
	Ian Khama					Scheduled elections							
◆	Roch Marc Christian Kaboré					Scheduled elections							
	Pierre Nkurunziza					Scheduled elections							
		Jorge Fonseca						Scheduled elections					
				Scheduled elections									
		Faustin-Archange Touadéra						Scheduled elections					
		Idriss Deby						Scheduled elections					
		Azali Assoumani						Scheduled elections					
		Denis Sassou-Nguesso							Scheduled elections				
	Alassane Ouattara						Scheduled elections						
				Scheduled elections									
		Ismail Omar Guelleh						Scheduled elections					
◆	Abdul Fatah Khalil Al- Sisi			Scheduled elections									
		Teodoro Obiang							Scheduled elections				
								Scheduled elections					
		Ali Bongo Ondimba							Scheduled elections				
◆	Adama Barrow							Scheduled elections					
		Nana Akufo-Addo					Scheduled elections						
	Alpha Condé						Scheduled elections						
	José Mário Vaz					Scheduled elections							
				Scheduled elections									
	Pakalitha Mosisili					Scheduled elections							
				Scheduled elections									
				Scheduled elections									
	Hery Rajaonarimampianina					Scheduled elections							
	Peter Mutharika					Scheduled elections							
				Scheduled elections									
	Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz					Scheduled elections							
	Anerood Jugnauth			Pravind Jugnauth				Scheduled elections					
		Abdel-Ilah Benkiran						Scheduled elections					
	Filipe Nyusi						Scheduled elections						
	Hage Geingob						Scheduled elections						
		Mahamadou Issoufou						Scheduled elections					
	Muhammadu Buhari					Scheduled elections							
				Scheduled elections									
		Evaristo do Espírito Santo Carvalho						Scheduled elections					
				Scheduled elections									
	J. Michel	Danny Faure						Scheduled elections					
				Scheduled elections									
	A.S.Ahmed	O. A. Ali Sharmarke	H.A.Khayre	Scheduled elections									
	Jacob Zuma					Scheduled elections							
				Scheduled elections									
		Omar Al-Bashir					Scheduled elections						
				Scheduled elections									
		John Magufuli				Scheduled elections							
		Faure Gnassingbe				Scheduled elections							
	Beji Essebsi					Scheduled elections							
		Yoweri Museveni						Scheduled elections					
◆	E. Lungu	Edgar Lungu						Scheduled elections					
						Scheduled elections							


Name President/Prime Minister re-elected Name New President/Prime Minister Name Victory of an opposition/independent candidate ◆ Died in office
 TG Transitional/temporary/contested government Scheduled elections Upcoming elections ◆ Violent ousting (coup, arrest, assassination)

03_African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Leaving power: 16 Heads of State still there, half of them for more than 20 years

- Over the past decade, almost 70% of Africa's population (32 countries) has gone through a direct or indirect presidential election that has led to a change of Head of State.
- 56 Heads of State have left office in total, with nine dead in office and 13 stepped down following a coup, arrest or uprising.
- Through elections, leaders of 17 countries have remained the same over the past decade: Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, DRC, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Liberia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe. With the exception of Liberia 16 of the leaders took office before 2006. Two of the leaders, Gambia and Seychelles, are no longer in power.
- However, in 2016, for more than a quarter of Africa's population the leader has still not changed for the last ten years, and often much more.



"President for life": constitutional changes

- According to Afrobarometer, in 34 African countries, about three-quarters of citizens are in favour of limiting presidential mandates to two terms. This proves to be true among the more educated citizens and the ones with greater exposure to news outlets.
- According to Afrobarometer, in countries with no term limits, there is a higher desire to put them in place, such as Uganda, Togo, Cameroon and Zimbabwe.
- Over the past decade, African countries have seen a mixed picture of presidential term limits and constitutional changes.
- In ten countries, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Mauritius, South Sudan, Togo and Uganda, the presidents are not subject to constitutional term limits.
- In six countries: Algeria, Djibouti, Mauritania, Senegal, Seychelles and Zimbabwe a change of constitution has led to limiting term, age, or both over the last decade.

Afrobarometer

Constitutional changes


Country	Year	Age	Term limit	Term duration
Algeria	2008		Abolished the two-term limit	
	2016		Established the two-term limit	
Cameroon	2008		Abolished the two-term limit	
Congo	2015	Abolished the 70 years old age restriction	Abolished the two-term limit	
Côte d'Ivoire	2016	Abolished the 75 years old age restriction		
Djibouti	2010	Established the age restriction between 40 and 75 years old	Abolished the two-term limit	Reduced terms from six to five years
Equatorial Guinea	2011	Abolished the 75 years old age restriction	Established the two-term limit	
Madagascar	2010	Lowered the minimum age for presidential candidates from 40 to 35		
Mauritania	2006		Established the two five-year term	
Niger	2009		Abolished the two five-year term limit	
Rwanda	2015		Shortened terms from seven to five years*	
			* With an exception for the current president Paul Kagame	
Senegal	2016	Established the age restriction of presidential candidates to 75		
Seychelles	2016		Established the two five-year terms	
Zimbabwe	2013		Established the two-term limit	

03_African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

The generation gap

The age gap between the population & their Head of State



- In 2016, the average median age of the African population is about 20 years old while the average age of the Heads of State is 66 years.
- Mauritius is the country with the smallest age difference between the median age of the population and the President (22 years), and Zimbabwe the country with the largest age difference (73 years).

■ Age of Head of State (2016)
● Median age of population (2015)

UNDESA

No term limits: widening age gaps

Country	President	2016			2025		
		Age of President (2016)	Median age of population (2015)	Age disparity (2016)	Age of President (2025)	Median age of population (2025)	Age disparity (2025)
Cameroon	Paul Biya	83	19	65	92	20	72
Congo	Denis Sassou-Nguesso	73	19	54	82	19	63
Uganda	Yoweri Museveni	72	16	56	81	17	64
Djibouti	Ismail Omar Guelleh	69	24	45	78	26	52
South Sudan	Salva Kiir Mayardit	65	19	46	74	20	54
Chad	Idriss Deby	64	16	48	73	17	56
Gabon	Ali Bongo Ondimba	57	21	36	66	23	43
Mauritius	Ameenah Gurib-Fakim	57	35	22	66	39	27
Gambia	Adama Barrow	51	17	34	60	18	42
Togo	Faure Gnassingbe	50	19	31	59	20	39

■ Presidents subject to constitutional age limits

UNDESA (2)

- Despite not having term limits, President Yoweri Museveni, President Ismail Omar Guelleh and President Adama Barrow are subject to constitutional age limits. In Uganda and Djibouti, the maximum age for the president is 75 and in Gambia it is 65.

Constitute Project; State House of Uganda; WIPO

03_African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

SPOTLIGHT | YOUTH POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT

African initiatives for youth political empowerment

- Aimed at addressing the under-representation of the youth in the political arena, commissions for civic education, youth quotas and agendas on youth political participation have been adopted by several African countries.
- The African Youth Charter (AYC) provides a strategic framework for African States to empower and enhance the youth's role in society and politics at continental, regional and national levels. The AYC was endorsed by the African Union Heads of States and Governments in 2006, entering into force in 2009 as part of the African Youth Decade Plan of Action 2009-2018.
- The AYC has been signed by 42 member states of the African Union and ratified by 38. This represents 89.0% and 76.8% respectively of the total African population.
- The 15 member states of the African Union that had not ratified as of June 2016 are: Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, CAR, Comoros, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, São Tomé & Príncipe and Sudan.

AU; IPU; UNESCO; UNDP

When this information was collected, Morocco was not part of the African Union.

Selected initiatives


In **Tunisia**, political parties are required to put forward at least one candidate of 35 years old or younger, risking the loss of the right to one half of their public campaign financing if they fail to do so. Hence, 28 MPs are 35 years old or younger.

In **Morocco**, in the Lower House of Parliament, 30 seats are reserved for candidates under 40 years old.

In **Ghana**, the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) trains "youth aspirants" on the roles and responsibilities of elected members of parliament ahead of the elections.

The Independent Electoral Commission of **Nigeria** (INEC) partnered with the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) to support the recruitment of voter registration and polling station workers. With the introduction of biometric voter registration in 2010, NYSC members, under the age of 30, facilitated the transition to the use of new technologies. The INEC now trains and deploys young people enrolled in the NYSC programme for its election day operations.

The eligibility age for parliamentary elections dropped from 30 to 25 in 2011 in **Egypt**.



In **Kenya's** National Assembly, 12 seats are reserved for representatives to be nominated by political parties to represent special interests, including youth, persons with disabilities and workers. The Senate has also elected two youth representatives.

In **Uganda**, five seats in Parliament are reserved for youth representatives. In 2015, 25 MPs were elected to represent special interest groups, including the youth.

The **Rwandan** constitution reserves two seats in the lower house for citizens under 35, to be chosen by an electoral college including members of the National Youth Council.


Prior to the 2014 national elections, the 'IXSA' ('I Vote **South Africa**') campaign was launched to encourage youth registration, participation, and engagement to make politics more accessible to the youth.

AceProject; IDEA; IPU, IPU(2); NDI; UNDP

VOTER DISENCHANTMENT

Youth: the next majority

% of citizens under the legal voting age in Africa (2015)




MIF based on: AceProject; UNDESA

- These will become the bulk of voters in the next ten years.
- The legal voting age for all African countries is 18, except in Cameroon where it is 20.
- On average, 46.2% of African citizens are currently still below the legal voting age.
- In 16 countries, accounting for 47.3% of Africa's population, more than half of the population is still below the legal voting age: Niger, Uganda, Chad, Angola, Mali, Cameroon, Gambia, Zambia, DRC, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Burundi, Nigeria, Senegal.
- In four countries, the legal military enlistment age is below the legal voting age.

Youth political engagement is decreasing

% 15-29 year-olds in Africa



Afrobarometer

- Over the past decade, youth political engagement has decreased in Africa in terms of political interest, election participation and civic engagement.

03_African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

VOTER DISENCHANTMENT

Registered voters: progress to be made

- In all but one country the legal voting age in national elections is 18, except for Cameroon (20) and Somalia which has no information.
- Of the 51 African countries that have information, voter registration is compulsory in only 23 countries accounting for 37.4% of the continent's population.
- It is compulsory to vote in presidential and parliamentary elections in only three countries (DRC, Egypt, Gabon), accounting for 14.4% of the continent's population.
- Tunisia, accounting for 1.0% of the continent's population, is the only country that uses the national citizen register as a registration method for national elections.
- Chad, Ghana, Namibia, São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles and Zimbabwe, accounting for 5.0% of Africa's population, have more registered voters than the size of the voting population.
- Registered voters account for less than two thirds of the voting population in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan and Tunisia. These countries account for 18.2% of Africa's population.

Civil registration is the way by which countries keep a continuous and complete record of births and deaths of their population. Data on civil registration needs urgent attention in Africa.

87% of deaths occur in countries without a complete death registration system. Eight countries have no death registration system: Angola, Cameroon, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Somalia, Sudan and Zambia.

Registered votes, % of voting age population


Country	Latest election year	Registered voters (millions)	Voting age population (VAP) (millions)	Registered voters as a % of VAP	Latest census year
Zimbabwe	2013	6.4	5.7	112.3	2012
São Tomé & Príncipe	2016	0.1	0.1	111.8	2012
Chad	2016	6.3	5.8	107.6	2009
Ghana	2016	15.7	15.0	104.9	2010
Namibia	2014	1.2	1.2	102.8	2011
Seychelles	2015	0.1	0.1	101.5	2010
Guinea	2015	6.0	6.1	99.5	2014
Egypt	2014	53.8	54.3	99.2	2006
Cabo Verde	2016	0.3	0.4	97.8	2010
CAR	2016	2.0	2.0	97.4	2003
Sierra Leone	2012	2.7	2.8	96.9	2004
DRC	2011	32.0	34.0	94.1	.
Liberia	2011	1.8	1.9	94.1	2008
Tanzania	2015	23.2	25.0	92.7	2012
Mozambique	2014	11.0	11.9	92.5	2007
Niger	2016	7.6	8.2	92.5	2012
Rwanda	2010	5.2	5.7	91.5	2012
Malawi	2014	7.5	8.2	91.4	2008
Zambia	2016	6.7	7.3	91.4	2010
Mali	2013	6.8	7.5	91.2	2009
Uganda	2015	15.3	17.1	89.3	2014
Guinea-Bissau	2014	0.8	0.9	89.3	2009
Equatorial Guinea	2009	0.3	0.3	88.9	2002
Benin	2016	4.7	5.4	88.2	2013
Algeria	2014	22.9	26.0	88.2	2008
Togo	2015	3.5	4.0	87.3	2010
Congo	2016	2.2	2.6	84.1	2007
Gambia	2016	0.9	1.1	79.3	2013
Senegal	2012	5.1	6.5	78.5	2013
Burundi	2015	3.8	5.1	74.8	2008
Cameroon	2011	7.3	9.9	73.6	2005
Nigeria	2015	67.4	91.7	73.5	2006
South Africa	2014	25.4	34.7	73.2	2011
Mauritania	2014	1.3	1.9	71.4	2013
Comoros	2016	0.3	0.4	71.2	2003
Gabon	2016	0.6	0.9	70.5	2013
Madagascar	2013	8.0	11.5	69.6	1993
Tunisia	2014	5.3	7.9	67.0	2014
Sudan	2015	13.1	19.7	66.7	2008
Kenya	2013	14.4	22.2	64.7	2009
Burkina Faso	2015	5.5	9.1	60.6	2006
Côte d'Ivoire	2015	6.3	12.9	49.0	2014
Djibouti	2016	0.2	0.5	35.7	2009

MIF based on: IDEA; UNstats 2016

Diaspora: limited voting

The diaspora vote

Africans in the diaspora (millions)



- Over 32.5 million Africans live outside their home country in 2015, accounting for 2.7% of Africa's total population.
- Eleven out of 50 countries, accounting for 14.5% of Africans in the diaspora in 2015, do not allow citizens to vote outside of their countries: Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Seychelles, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda.
- Four African countries (Angola, Lesotho, Mauritius and Zimbabwe) allow citizens to vote outside of the country but apply strict conditions.
- Amongst the 11 countries that do not allow any of their citizens to vote outside of their home country:
 - The Liberian diaspora account for 6.1% of the country's total population and one third of the country's wealth.
 - The Togolese diaspora account for 6.1% of the country's total population and one tenth of the country's wealth.
 - The Gambian diaspora account for 4.5% of the country's total population and one fifth of the country's wealth.


AceProject, AceProject (2)

Country	Total diaspora population 2015 (millions)	Diaspora % of total population 2015	Remittances, % of GDP 2015
Lesotho	0.4	17.0	16.0
Mauritius	0.2	13.2	0.0
Seychelles	0.0	12.2	1.3
Equatorial Guinea	0.1	9.6	.
Liberia	0.3	6.1	31.2
Togo	0.4	6.1	9.7
Zimbabwe	0.9	5.5	14.2
Congo	0.2	4.8	.
Gambia	0.1	4.5	19.2
Angola	0.6	2.2	0.0
Uganda	0.7	1.9	3.8
DRC	1.4	1.8	0.0
Madagascar	0.2	0.7	4.4
Nigeria	1.1	0.6	4.4
Tanzania	0.3	0.6	0.9

WB; UNDESA

Parliamentary representation of the diaspora

- Currently, four African countries have political representation of the diaspora in national legislatures: Algeria, Angola, Cabo Verde, Mozambique, 2.1%, 1.4%, 8.3% and 0.8% of seats respectively.



Overseas Vote Foundation


03_African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

VOTER DISENCHANTMENT

Voter turnout: a weakening trend

- Over the past decade, Rwanda had the highest voter turnout (97.5%) in its presidential election in 2010.
- Over the past decade, Cabo Verde had the lowest voter turnout (35.5%) in its presidential election in 2014.
- Voter turnout for presidential elections has declined following the Arab Spring in more than half of African countries (20 out of 38) that had two or more presidential elections in the past decade, including North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania and Tunisia).
- Compared to the earliest election year in the last decade, Tunisia, Côte d'Ivoire, Algeria and Sudan's voter turnout has declined by more than a quarter.
- The average African turnout has declined slightly from 64.9% (between 2006-2010) to 62.8% (between 2011-2016).

Voter turnout, earliest & latest election years over the last decade




Election monitoring: taking ownership

- A growing ownership of elections has been seen in Africa over the past decade as the African Union and other regional bodies increased their election monitoring activities.
- Over the past decade, the African Union monitored more than 100 elections (both presidential and parliamentary) in Africa.
- In the most recent years (2011-2016), election monitoring missions by the African Union, and some Regional Economic Communities (RECs), particularly ECOWAS has more than tripled while the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and SADC have more than doubled.
- According to Afrobarometer surveys, the citizens of 36 African countries share a positive view of the quality of their elections, as 65% regarded their latest election as "completely free and fair" or "free and fair, but with minor problems".
- However, a lot more of the respondents are aware of the existence of electoral commissions in 2014/2015 compared to ten years ago.

	Continental Missions	REC Missions
2006-2016	>150	>90
2006-2010	<30	<20
2011-2016	>120	>70

ACE Project; All; EISA

Trust in electoral commissions




Afrobarometer

Election Monitoring Agencies in the IIAC

- For the first time, the 2016 IIAC includes measures on election monitoring agencies, captured in a new clustered indicator *Election Monitoring Agencies* from Global Integrity. Derived from qualitative assessments, the indicator assesses whether agencies mandate to organise and monitor national elections; their protection from political interference and whether they make public reports available before and after a national election.
- The continental average score for this indicator is 41.9 in 2015, making it the second lowest scoring measure in the *Participation* sub-category.

- Kenya is the best performing country, receiving 87.5 points, while on the other end of the spectrum, seven countries (Angola, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gambia, Somalia and Swaziland), accounting for 4.2% of the continental population, score 0.0.
- ECOWAS is the highest scoring REC (52.5 points), the majority (12 out of 15) member countries receiving a score higher than the continental average. Meanwhile, ECCAS is the lowest scoring REC (26.3 points), the majority (seven out of 10) member countries scoring below the African average.

African average scores & trends



MIF

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
VOTER DISENCHANTMENT

Election-related violence: on the rise

- In the past ten years, even though many of the elections were considered “free and fair” some have not been free of violence before, during or after the election.
- During the election day, several presidential elections in the past decade involved violent incidents.
- In Africa, on average, from 2011 onwards there was a spike of election-related violence one day before and on election day.

Election-related violence consists of violent events occurring before, during or after elections. Two measures from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) are used to calculate election-related violence: riots/protests and violence against civilians. Direct presidential elections (including multiple rounds where relevant) were analysed.


% of elections with violent incidents



- Election-related violence on the election day has increased from 13.9% to 45.3% from 2006-2010 to 2011-2016, on average.
- Violence may be triggered due to discontent with the government, but also as a response to limited forms of democratic participation.

ACLED; NDI; Psephos Adam Carr Election Archive


Growing violence during election day



- 2013 and 2014 are the years where most of the elections encountered election-related violence during the election day.
- In 2013, only the first round of the Malian presidential election did not include election-related violence during the election day.
- In 2016, a reduction in election-related violence can be observed with only three elections out of 13 - in Chad, Ghana and Uganda - resulting in violent incidents.

ACLED; NDI; Psephos Adam Carr Election Archive

Violent elections by region




- There was an increase in election-related violence during election day throughout the past decade in every African region.
- Until 2010, North Africa and Central Africa did not register election-related violence during election day. Elections with violent incidents grew to 71.4% and 20.0% respectively from 2011 to 2016.
- The regions with the highest levels of election-related violence are East Africa, Southern Africa and North Africa, with 77.8%, 72.7% and 71.4% of the elections respectively resulting in violent incidents during election day.

ACLED; NDI; Psephos Adam Carr Election Archive

Protests & riots on the continent

Number of protests & riots, 2006-2015



- African citizens are protesting and rioting more. Over the last decade, the number of protests and riots have increased more than tenfold (by 1,120%).
- Over the last decade, the *Social Unrest* IIAG indicator has registered an important deterioration of -7.3 points. CAR is the country that has declined the most (-75.0), followed by Tunisia and Libya (-50.0).
- Protests and riots are generally becoming more violent, as fatalities increased by 407% from 2006 to 2015, with spikes in the number of fatalities in 2008, 2011 and 2013.
- In the past few years (2013-2015), the top motivations for public protest in Africa have been change of government, followed by poor economic conditions and public services, demands for wage increases and better working conditions.
- Protests and riots have also been used as a "democracy guarantor", either paving the way to the removal from office of long-standing autocrats (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya), or ensuring the respect of democracy (Burundi).

AfDB, OECD, UNDP; ISSAfrica; MIF

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
VOTER DISENCHANTMENT

Current democracy: growing scepticism


- According to Afrobarometer surveys, African citizens are becoming more sceptical about their democratic representatives. The trust and performance approval levels of Presidents, members of Parliaments and local councillors have declined over the last decade.

What % of African citizens trust their ...








PRESIDENTS?



MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT?



LOCAL COUNCILLORS?



Afrobarometer


■ Not at all/ Just a little ■ Somewhat/ A lot ■ Missing/ Refused/ Don't know

Who do African citizens trust?

- Citizens trust religious leaders, the army and traditional leaders before their elected representatives.
- About three quarters of the African population feel that their members of Parliament (78.6%) and their local councillors (72.7%) only sometimes or never listen to what their constituents have to say.


Afrobarometer (3)

Afrobarometer (2016)




What % of African citizens approve the performance of their ...








PRESIDENTS?



MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT?



LOCAL COUNCILLORS?



Afrobarometer (2)

■ Strongly disapprove/ Disapprove
 ■ Approve/ Strongly approve
 ■ Missing/ Refused/ Don't know

Less than half of Africa's population approve of their local councillors.

03_African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

THE SHRINKING SPACE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY?

Civil society participation: a mixed picture

Civil society, as defined by V-Dem, is voluntary and autonomous from the government and involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the State and hold State officials accountable. Amongst others, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) include interest groups, labour unions, social movements, professional associations and welfare organisations.

V-Dem

- In the 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) a new indicator on *Civil Society Participation* was added with measures from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and the Africa Integrity Indicators.
- It assesses the extent to which the government enables the participation of civil society in the political process; allows NGOs to organise freely; and does not persecute or harass NGO employees.


- According to the IIAG results, the existence of a vibrant civil society is highly correlated with respect for citizens' rights and democratic participation.

Correlations between *Civil Society Participation* &...

Sub-category  Rights			
Indicator	<i>Freedom of Expression</i>	<i>Freedom of Association & Assembly</i>	<i>Civil Liberties</i>
Correlation	0.9	0.8	0.8

Sub-category  Participation		
Indicator	<i>Free & Fair Elections</i>	<i>Legitimacy of Political Process</i>
Correlation	0.8	0.7


IIAG *Civil Society Participation* (2006-2015)



- Since 2006, the indicator *Civil Society Participation* has registered a marginal improvement (+0.5), on average at the continental level.
- Nineteen out of 54 countries saw their levels of *Civil Society Participation* deteriorate in the last decade, including 11 by more than 10.0 points. This deterioration impacts almost half of the continent's population (48.5%).

- The indicator *Civil Society Participation* is strongly correlated with both *Freedom of Expression* ($r=0.9$) and *Media Freedom* ($r=0.8$) in the 2016 IIAG.
- Over the last decade, *Freedom of Expression* in Africa has deteriorated by -2.7 points in the IIAG, Kenya being the country that has deteriorated the most (-16.5), followed by Madagascar (-14.9) and Burundi (-13.8).
- On average, only about half (51.0%) of citizens in Africa feel “completely free” to say what they think.
- *Media Freedom* scores have also deteriorated, on average, by -3.9 points over the past decade.
- The five worse performers in *Civil Society Participation* – Mali, Ethiopia, Niger, Angola, Gambia - have all registered deteriorations in the *Media Freedom* indicator over the past decade.
- Government interference in freedom of expression has become subtler, including laws on defamation and libel suits, security laws and uncensored but limited internet access.

IIAG Freedom of Expression (2006-2015)



- The indicator *Civil Society Participation* is also strongly correlated ($r=0.8$) with *Freedom of Association & Assembly*.
- Over the last decade, *Freedom of Association & Assembly* has deteriorated by -4.4 points on average at the continental level, with Comoros being the country that has deteriorated the most (-62.5), followed by Madagascar (-37.5) and Cameroon (-31.2).
- Eight countries register a worrying deterioration of more than 20.0 points in *Freedom of Association & Assembly*: Comoros, Madagascar, Cameroon, São Tomé & Príncipe, Burundi, Mauritius, Egypt and South Africa.
- On average, a little more than half (58.0%) of the citizens in Africa feel "completely free" to join any political organisation.

Legend:

- +10.1 to +35.0
- +0.1 to +10.0
- 0.0
- 0.1 to -10.0
- 10.1 to -20.0
- 20.1 to -65.0
- no trend 2006-2015

MIF

03_African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

THE SHRINKING SPACE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY?

Social media: wider use, stronger bans

Social media freedom

- Over the last decade, the number of individuals using the Internet in Africa has increased by 784% from 2006 to 2015. It is estimated that over 120 million African citizens might be using Facebook every month.
- The rise of social media, especially on mobile devices, allows people to bypass traditional media and speak to large numbers without a journalist intermediary. People's voices can reach broader audiences and are harder to censor or counter.
- Social media has paved the way for important democratic changes by allowing citizens to find shared grievances, opportunities for

action and to organise movements. During the Arab Spring, protests in Tunisia and Egypt were mainly organised via Facebook and Twitter.

- As a direct consequence, a decline in Internet freedom has been registered. At the continental level, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance registers a deterioration (-3.4) in *Online Censorship* in the past decade with 17 (out of 53) countries registering a decline. Kenya has registered the largest decline falling 75.0 score points over the decade.
- The most censored Internet topics are "criticism of authorities", "corruption", "conflict" and "political opposition".

Freedom House; Howard, P.N. & Hussain, M.M.; ITU; Roth, K



Government barriers to Civil Society Organisations



BARRIERS TO REGISTRATION

- ▶ The governments of Burundi, Ethiopia and South Sudan achieve monopolistic control over entry and exit of CSOs into public life and the governments of Algeria, Eritrea, Rwanda and Sudan exercise substantial control.



RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL FUNDING

- ▶ Ethiopia restricts the foreign funding of any group working on human rights or governance to 10% of its revenue.
- ▶ Angola bans funding from foreign entities that are not approved by a government body.



RESTRICTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS

- ▶ Uganda's Public Order Management Bill 2011 includes a requirement to inform the police at least seven days in advance of any public meetings of three or more persons.
- ▶ Most recently, in mid-January 2017, following anti-government protests and strikes against the discrimination of Anglophones by the French-speaking majority, the Cameroon government shut the Internet down in English-speaking areas of the country.



EXCLUSION FROM POLICY-MAKING

- ▶ In 2015, important CSOs were recognised as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voices on such issues in only four countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Tunisia.



VAGUE REGULATION POWERS

- ▶ In Tanzania, an international NGO must "refrain from doing any act which is likely to cause misunderstanding".
- ▶ Uganda's 2015 NGO Bill prohibits "any act, which is prejudicial to the interests of Uganda and the dignity of the people of Uganda".

Govt. of Uganda; Oxfam; Roth, K.; V-Dem (2); VOA

THE NEXT GENERATION OF DEMOCRACY

Direct democracy: alternative tools

- Direct democracy allows citizens to decide about specific laws without delegating the decision-making process solely

to their elected representatives. It complements representative democracy, where citizens choose which candidates and parties they want to elect and empower them to make decisions on their behalf.

Direct democracy mechanisms

Mechanism	Definition	Legally available in # African countries (/50)	Population in Africa with access to direct democracy mechanisms (%)
Mandatory Referendum	Direct vote on a specific, political, constitutional or legislative issue. The result is legally binding.	35 countries 	79.0
Optional Referendum	Direct vote on a specific, political, constitutional or legislative issue. The result is not legally binding.	35 countries 	58.2
Citizens' Initiatives	Vote on a political, constitutional or legislative measure proposed by several citizens, who must gather a minimum of signatures in support of it.	6 countries 	9.9
Agenda Initiatives	Citizens can place an issue on the agenda of a parliament or legislative assembly by gathering enough signatures in support of it.	7 countries 	20.6
Recall	Vote on ending the term of office of an elected official if enough signatures in support of a recall vote are collected.	5 countries 	31.6

- In Africa, more than half of the countries have legal provisions for Mandatory and Optional Referendums, accounting for 79% and 58% of the population respectively. Similarly, in Europe, out of the 39 countries assessed, more than half have these mechanisms in place.
- However, only a small minority of African countries ensures access to other direct democracy mechanisms such as Citizens' Initiatives, Agenda Initiatives and Recall. In Europe, almost half of the countries assessed do so.
- Only three European countries (Belarus, Liechtenstein, Slovakia) have legal provisions for Recall, accounting for 2% of Europe's population. In Africa, five countries, accounting for 32% of citizens have provisions for Recall.

PROS

- In the context of increasing voter apathy and disenchantment, and declining voter turnout, direct democracy can help to re-engage citizens in the democratic political process.
- Citizens can monitor and check the government throughout its terms, strengthening political transparency and legitimacy.
- Direct democracy can be used to resolve major political questions, where a decision taken by the people will more likely be accepted as legitimate.

CONS

- Direct democracy demands from citizens a relatively high level of knowledge of issues that are sometimes complex.
- Direct democracy may threaten the civil rights of vulnerable minorities or exacerbate racial or ethnic tensions in some societies.
- Referendums have also been employed by authoritarian regimes to create a veneer of democratic legitimacy.

03_African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

THE NEXT GENERATION OF DEMOCRACY

Participatory democracy: influencing public spending

- Participatory democracy is a democratic procedure that seeks decision-making and consultation from direct citizen participation. It can consist of a variety of mechanisms such as participatory budgeting, neighbourhood councils and consultative referendums.
- Data on participatory governance, derived from the Africa Integrity Indicators (AII), assessing the extent to which citizens can provide input into budget decisions, and the Open Budget Survey (OBS), assessing whether governments create the conditions that allow for direct engagement during the formal budget process, show varying results.
- In Ghana, Mauritius, Rwanda and Zambia citizens can fully participate in budget debates (100.0).
- The highest levels of public participation in budget process are reached in South Africa, Malawi, Zambia, Kenya, Ghana and Cameroon.

Budgetary participation: Kenya

The constitution and statutory laws establish participation mechanisms that offer citizens opportunities, during both budget formulation and approval, to influence policies and priorities.

The public can participate in the development of the Pre-Budget Statement, called the Budget Policy Statement. The Finance Ministry organises public hearings where citizens can input on the content of the Budget Policy Statement before it is presented to the legislature. The Institute of Economic Affairs undertakes public consultations across the country and prepares a Citizen's Alternative Budget which is presented at the public hearings.

When the legislature's Budget and Appropriations Committee considers the Executive's Budget Proposal, there is a two-month period where citizens can submit memoranda, email or presentations to influence the content of the budget.

Country	Citizen Participation in Budget Debates/100 (AII, 2015)	Public Participation in Budget Process/100 (OBS, 2015)
Algeria	25	0
Angola	0	12
Benin	25	17
Botswana	25	19
Burkina Faso	0	10
Burundi	25	.
Cabo Verde	50	.
Cameroon	25	29
CAR	0	.
Chad	0	2
Comoros	0	.
Congo	0	.
Côte d'Ivoire	0	.
Djibouti	0	.
DRC	0	13
Egypt	0	8
Equatorial Guinea	0	2
Eritrea	0	.
Ethiopia	50	.
Gabon	0	.
Gambia	0	.
Ghana	100	29
Guinea	0	.
Guinea-Bissau	25	.
Kenya	50	33
Lesotho	0	.
Liberia	25	21
Libya	0	.
Madagascar	0	.
Malawi	50	44
Mali	0	4
Mauritania	0	.
Mauritius	100	.
Morocco	50	2
Mozambique	0	2
Namibia	50	15
Niger	25	4
Nigeria	25	25
Rwanda	100	25
São Tomé & Príncipe	0	4
Senegal	0	13
Seychelles	0	.
Sierra Leone	50	31
Somalia	0	.
South Africa	50	65
South Sudan	0	.
Sudan	0	0
Swaziland	0	.
Tanzania	50	33
Togo	50	.
Tunisia	0	21
Uganda	25	23
Zambia	100	40
Zimbabwe	50	15

E-democracy: transparency & efficiency

- E-Democracy refers to the processes and structures that encompass all forms of electronic communication (through Internet, mobile and other technologies) between government and the citizen.
- The UN E-Participation Index, a component of the UN E-Government Survey, measures the capacity and willingness of the state in promoting deliberate, participatory decision-making in public. It sets a framework for the provision of information by the government to citizens through three indicators :

E-INFORMATION

Enabling participation by providing citizens with public information and access to information without and upon demand.

E-CONSULTATION

Engaging citizens in contributions to and deliberation on public policies and services.

E-DECISION-MAKING

Empowering citizens through co-design of policy option and co-production of service components and delivery modalities.

- By allowing faster, less costly and wider communication, the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) enhances the direct involvement and participation of citizens, increases the transparency of the political process, and improves the quality of opinion formation by opening new spaces of information and deliberation.
- Applications of e-Participation in remote areas could help citizens connect with their local and national governments.
- Africa is the region in the world with lowest e-Participation levels.
- In Africa, Morocco has the highest e-Participation levels, followed by Tunisia and Mauritania. In contrast, Chad and Djibouti are the countries where e-Participation is most limited.
- E-Democracy presents technological and social challenges, amongst which is the "digital divide". E-Democracy initiatives may alienate those who lack physical access to ICT or the skills to use them. In East Africa, ICT tools for governance are most effective in cases where low-cost and non-Internet based methods and tools such as radio and mobile phones are used.

E-voting: Namibia


Electronic voting (e-voting) refers to the use of electronic systems to cast and count votes and can increase the security of the ballot, speed up the processing of results, make voting easier and reduce fraud.

Namibia was the first African country to use e-voting in a national election. During the 2014 general election, the Electoral Commission of Namibia deployed 2,080 sets of e-voting machines at fixed and temporary polling stations.


E-voting was largely successful in Namibia and its adoption by other Southern Africa countries, and permanent adoption in Namibia, was recommended.

EISA; IDEA

2016 UN E-Participation Index, country scores



2016 UN E-Participation Index, continental average scores



Score/1, higher is better

IGI; UNDESA

03_African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

THE NEXT GENERATION OF DEMOCRACY

Open data on the continent: National Statistics Offices


Budget monitoring: Nigeria

BudgIT is a platform that uses data-mining tools to help citizens understand how the government is spending their money. The project uses infographics that describe patterns and trends in Nigerian public spending, conducts data journalism and engages the public using other communication tools.

It also allows citizens to help monitor public initiatives

by posting information and pictures, and demanding government action with regard to unsolved problems. BudgIT is a private initiative that has reached over 750,000 Nigerians, and has been replicated in Ghana and Sierra Leone. A similar initiative in Uganda has been promoted by the central government, although it is not as successful as Nigeria's.

Club de Madrid



- Open data – free, available to all, accessible, licensed for use and reuse and well-documented – enables e-Democracy. Citizens that are accurately informed not only perceive greater governmental transparency and accountability, but also can actively use the data and participate.
- In Africa, although 46 countries have an official National Statistics Office (NSO) website available, only 20 provide data in a machine-readable format. Many countries publish data only in PDF files or as images from print publications. Only 19 countries actively outreach via newsletter or social media engagement.
- Even though data may be available online from NSO websites, it may often be out of date. In 2014, one quarter of African NSO websites had not been updated for over a year.

- **Availability**
Existence of an official NSO website
- **Online Data Accessibility**
NSO website data is in a machine-readable format
- **Active Outreach to Users**
NSO active outreach via newsletter or social media engagement
- **None**

PARIS21

SPOTLIGHT | TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP

- Prior to the colonial demarcation of the continent, several African countries, traditional chiefs and political systems were well-known for their “highly participatory nature”, in which community gatherings offered a wide platform for citizens to express their concerns and take part in the decision-making process. The terms used for these community gatherings varied across the continent:

PITSO
(LESOTHO)

SHIR
(SOMALIA)

KGOTLA
(BOTSWANA)


BARAZA
(KENYA)

- In 2015, African citizens trust their traditional leaders more than their Presidents, members of Parliament or local councillors. Also, the performance approval levels for traditional leadership are higher than for democratic representatives.
- According to Afrobarometer surveys, in 2009 45.1% of African citizens believed that traditional leaders had “some” or “a great deal” of influence in governing the local community.

African citizens trust “somewhat”/“a lot” their leaders (%) 2014/2015



African citizens “approve” the performance of their leaders (%) 2014/2015



Traditional leadership: Botswana & Mozambique

Botswana's democracy is strongly tied to the traditional Tswana *kgotla* system, which creates a public forum where citizens can voice their opinion and reach a common consensus on several issues. This forum is headed by a village chief, as unlike for many

African nations, chieftainship is recognised in Botswana. *Kgotla* practices are also recognised in the constitution of Botswana.

In **Mozambique**, the government tried to foster a stronger civic participation in local government through traditional chiefs, while “limiting their influence over local government”. A decree reinforced that local state bodies should indeed interact with traditional leaders and secretaries of suburban neighbourhoods.

Traditional methods of mediation & conflict resolution: Rwanda, Tanzania & Sierra Leone

In 2006, **Rwanda** launched an innovative system known as the *Imihigo* process, aimed at holding mayors accountable for service delivery. The government adapted the system by incorporating “specific measures for planning, monitoring, evaluation and accountability”. In this way, central government can coordinate with local projects, and strategies and targets at both levels are aligned. By 2010, government officials believed that the *Imihigo* process had resulted in improved service delivery in the districts.

Established in 1985, Ward tribunals in **Tanzania** are judicial organs made up of members who are elected by a ward committee, each of which is led by a chairman appointed by the local ward development council (WDC). Ward tribunals are an evolution of the colonial customary courts, and today supplement the local judiciary by providing mediation services, thus easing its workload. Their mediation and arbitration functions extend to disputes that arise at village level, such as reconciliation within marriages or disputes over child-maintenance settlements, land or water.

In 2011, **Sierra Leone** adopted a national chiefdom governance and traditional administration policy to provide a framework for good governance and minimise conflicts over financial resources between councils and chiefdoms.

03_African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

UNTAPPED LOCAL DEMOCRACY

Cities' populations: bigger than countries'

- More than half of Africa's population will live in urban areas by 2037.
- The 20 most populous cities in Africa manage city populations equivalent to many country populations.
- Cairo, Africa's most populous city, manages a population that

is larger than each of the 36 least populous countries on the continent in 2015.

- Population projections estimate that Cairo's population will be larger than the collected 33 least populous countries in Africa in 2025.
- Several African cities will see economic expansion over the next decade and a half, some seeing 250% to 350% GDP growth.

Cities vs. countries populations (millions)

2015


Urban Agglomeration	=	Country	+	Country
Cairo	18.8	Burkina Faso	18.1	
Lagos	13.1	Chad	14.0	
Kinshasa	11.6	Burundi	11.2	
Johannesburg	9.4	UAE	9.2	
Luanda	5.5	Finland	5.5	
Khartoum	5.1	Eritrea	5.2	
Dar es Salaam	5.1	Norway	5.2	
Abidjan	4.9	CAR	4.9	
Alexandria	4.8	Liberia	4.5	
Nairobi	3.9	Mauritania	4.1	
Cape Town	3.7	Puerto Rico	3.7	
Kano	3.6	Gabon	1.7	& Guinea-Bissau 1.8
Dakar	3.5	Mauritius	1.3	& Lesotho 2.1
Casablanca	3.5	Uruguay	3.4	
Addis Ababa	3.2	Mauritius	1.3	& Lesotho 2.1
Ibadan	3.2	Gambia	2.0	& Cyprus 1.2
Yaoundé	3.1	Albania	2.9	
Douala	2.9	Jamaica	2.8	
Durban	2.9	Albania	2.9	
Ouagadougou	2.7	Namibia	2.5	

2025

Urban Agglomeration	=	Country	+	Country
Cairo	22.4	Zambia	21.9	
Lagos	20.0	Senegal	20.0	
Kinshasa	16.9	Burundi	15.2	& Bahrain 1.6
Johannesburg	11.0	Cuba	11.3	
Dar es Salaam	8.6	Jordan	8.5	
Luanda	8.6	Austria	8.8	
Khartoum	6.9	Libya	7.1	
Abidjan	6.7	Eritrea	6.6	
Nairobi	5.9	Congo	6.0	
Alexandria	5.7	Liberia	5.7	
Kano	5.1	Oman	5.1	
Dakar	5.1	Mauritania	5.1	
Ouagadougou	4.7	Qatar	2.6	& Gabon 2.1
Addis Ababa	4.7	Kuwait	4.7	
Ibadan	4.5	Panama	4.5	
Yaoundé	4.4	Djibouti	1.0	& Mongolia 3.4
Bamako	4.2	Gambia	2.7	& Trinidad & Tobago 1.4
Antananarivo	4.1	Croatia	4.1	
Douala	4.1	Eq. Guinea	1.1	& Namibia 3.0
Cape Town	4.1	Guinea-Bissau	2.3	& Latvia 1.9

UNDESA

Population & GDP growth (2014-2030)



Local democracy status

- Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) assessed the scope of local governments in 22 African countries in 2015, all of whom have local governments.
- Twelve countries with data elect their local executive and local assembly. Within the countries assessed, 65% of the population can elect their local executive and local assembly.
- Four countries – Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan - do not hold elections at the local level. Within the countries assessed, 14.5% of the population cannot elect their local executive and local assembly.
- The method by which the municipal council and local executives come to power varies, ranging from nominations through to appointments.
- The United Cities and Local Governments Global Report (GOLD) assessed 20 countries, of which nine can democratically remove local executives from power.
- Mozambique, Benin, South Africa and Mauritania allow independent candidates in local elections.
- In Ghana, political parties are excluded from local elections entirely; the list is open only to independent candidates.

Portrait of local democracy in selected countries

Country	MUNICIPAL COUNCIL			LOCAL EXECUTIVE					
	Voting system (majority, proportional or mixed)	Terms of office	Rounds of voting	Method of appointment	Terms of office	Mayor	Collegiate	Rounds of voting	Vote of no confidence/removal from office
Benin	Mixed (majority and proportional)	5 years	2 rounds	Indirect	5 years	No	Yes	Several	Yes
Cameroon	Mixed (majority and proportional)	5 years	1 round	Indirect	5 years	No	Yes	2 for the Major and 1 for deputies	Yes
Egypt	Relative majority	4 years	1 round	Nomination	-	-	-	-	No
Gabon	Proportional	5 years	1 round	Indirect	5 years	No	Yes	-	Yes
Ghana	Majority	4 years	1 round	Indirect	4 years	No	Yes	-	-
Guinea	Majority	5 years	1 round	Indirect	5 years	-	-	-	Yes
Côte d'Ivoire	Majority	5 years	2 rounds	Indirect	5 years	No	Yes	-	Yes
Kenya	-	5 years	1 round	Indirect	-	-	-	-	-
Madagascar	-	4 years	-	Direct	4 years	-	-	-	-
Mali	Majority	-	-	Indirect	-	No	Yes	-	Yes
Morocco	Majority	6 years	1 round	Indirect	6 years	No	Yes	-	Yes
Mozambique	Proportional	5 years	2 rounds	Direct	5 years	Yes	-	2 rounds	No
Niger	Proportional	5 years	1 round	Indirect	5 years	No	Yes	-	Yes
Nigeria	Majority	3 years	1 round	Direct	4 years	No	Yes	-	-
Senegal	Mixed (majority, proportional or mixed)	5 years	1 round	Indirect	5 years	Yes	No	-	Yes
South Africa	Proportional	6 years	1 round	Indirect	6 years	No	Yes	1 round	-
Tanzania	-	5 years	-	Indirect	5 years	No	Yes	-	-
Tunisia	Mixed (predominantly majority)	5 years	1 round	Indirect	-	Yes	Yes	1 round	No
Uganda	-	4 years	1 round	Direct	4 years	Yes	Yes	1 round	-
Zambia	Mixed	5 years	1 round	Direct	5 years	Yes	No	1 round	-

- No information available

UCLG

03_African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

UNTAPPED LOCAL DEMOCRACY


- Of the 20 African countries that have data over the past decade in the Local Government Index, half have improved in the extent to which they operate without interference from unelected actors at the local level.

Decentralisation: Liberia

Initiated in 2007, the Liberia Decentralization and Local Development (LDLD) program to support the decentralisation process and help governments access development funds is now succeeded by the Liberia Decentralization Support Program (LDSP), a five-year program of support with the same aims.

Accomplishments so far include citizens having access to documentation services at the county level i.e. birth and marriage certificates, with 70% of women receiving birth certificates. Further, as a result of the registration of traditional marriages at the county level, women now have more rights in their marriages.

Local Government Index trend, 2006-2015



V-Dem

The path to local autonomy: structures & resources

In 1972, Tanzania abolished local government to emphasise a unitary state and centralised planning. At the end of his administration President Nyerere said:

"There are certain things I would not do if I were to start again. One of them is the abolition of local governments."



Structures

DECONCENTRATION

The transfer of administrative responsibilities or functions to subordinate units of government, often based on geography. Relocation of execution to the local level with decision-making power remaining at the centre.

DEVOLUTION

A more far-reaching form of decentralisation, involving the transfer of governance powers and responsibilities to sub-national levels that are largely outside the direct control of the central government. Often a process which makes local governments directly accountable to local people.

DECENTRALISATION

Institutional decentralisation: the creation or development of administrative bodies, systems and mechanisms, at local or intergovernmental level, to manage and support the decentralisation process, including links between formal government bodies and other key local actors such as traditional authorities, nongovernmental organisations or private sector agents.

Political decentralisation: entails a degree of accountability to local people, through, for example, an electoral process.

Fiscal decentralisation: the transfer of powers to raise (tax) and retain (spend) financial resources to fulfil.

Finances: the lack of autonomy

- Local authorities in Africa lack financial independence and most major financial decisions must be funnelled through central governments:
- Excluding South Africa, only a handful of African countries allow sub-national authorities to control 5% or more of the national budget.
- Revenue collection is mainly centralised, leaving cities to wait on remittances from their national governments.
- The timing and amount of remittances can vary depending on the current economic situation or politics.
- In most countries, laws or constitutional frameworks bar cities from incurring long-term debt.

Citiscope; DIA; Eckert, A.

03_African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

SPOTLIGHT | AFRICA'S DIVERSITY: AN ASSET FOR DEMOCRACY?

- African countries are often linguistically, ethnically and religiously divided. In no African country is the whole population of only one or even two religions.
- Constitutions have been used across the continent as the basis for ensuring inclusivity and diversity management. The main challenge, however, is not the normative frameworks, but the institutional and political arrangements that enable major societal divisions to be moderated and reconciled in practice.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a voluntary self-monitoring mechanism by which African leaders subject their policies and practices to peer review by other Africans in four related areas: democracy and political governance, economic governance, corporate governance and socio-economic development.

APRM reviews suggested that **managing diversity is one of the overarching governance issues** requiring urgent responses by African countries.

APRM developed a response to the challenges of diversity: the **African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance** provides that *"State Parties shall respect ethnic, cultural and religious diversity which contributes to strengthening democracy and citizen participation"*. If this framework is enforced, it will promote good governance.

Proportional representation in selected countries

- In **Burundi**, the system is based on ethnic quotas: the Hutus are allotted 60% of the seats, the Tutsis get 40% and the Twa receive three seats. Women should receive a minimum of 30% of the seats. In addition, six of the 100 seats in the parliament are reserved for ethnic balancing.
- In **Kenya** and **Nigeria**, a Commission for Diversity Management to champion groups' concerns and to oversee implementation of the diversity-inclusion agenda was established.
- **Ethiopia, Nigeria** and **South Africa** designed political and constitutional measures to attempt to assuage fears and protect interests of ethnic minorities through arrangements like proportional representation and federalism.

Constitutional provisions on diversity in selected countries

GHANA



Constitution states that "the state shall actively promote the integration of the peoples of Ghana and prohibit discrimination and prejudice on the grounds of place of origin, circumstances of birth, ethnic origin, gender or religion, creed or other beliefs."

KENYA



Constitution specifies that political parties should have a "national character".

RWANDA



Banned the use of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities.

NIGERIA



Constitution specifically prohibits political parties with regional, ethnic or religious colouration. Names and party symbols must not reflect primordial identities, and parties should not base their electoral platforms on ethnic or sectarian agendas

SPOTLIGHT | SDGs

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

There are 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets which 193 countries agreed to be implemented from 1 January 2016. The SDGs have acknowledged governance as a fundamental element

of long-term development. Each of the chapters in this report are stamped with the relevant SDGs that are applicable to them.

1 NO POVERTY 	End poverty in all its forms everywhere.	10 REDUCED INEQUALITIES 	Reduce inequality within and among countries.
2 ZERO HUNGER 	End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.	11 SUSTAINABLE CITIES AND COMMUNITIES 	Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.
3 GOOD HEALTH AND WELL-BEING 	Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.	12 RESPONSIBLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION 	Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.
4 QUALITY EDUCATION 	Ensure inclusive and quality education for all and promote lifelong learning.	13 CLIMATE ACTION 	Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.
5 GENDER EQUALITY 	Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.	14 LIFE BELOW WATER 	Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources.
6 CLEAN WATER AND SANITATION 	Ensure access to water and sanitation for all.	15 LIFE ON LAND 	Sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, halt biodiversity loss.
7 AFFORDABLE AND CLEAN ENERGY 	Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.	16 PEACE, JUSTICE AND STRONG INSTITUTIONS 	Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies.
8 DECENT WORK AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 	Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all.	17 PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE GOALS 	Revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development.
9 INDUSTRY, INNOVATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 	Build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation.		

Glossary

Term	Definition
2000s commodity super-cycle	Rise and fall of many commodity prices (e.g. oil, metals, chemicals...) which took place during the first two decades of the 2000s (2000-2014). One of the main causes of the commodity boom was the rising demand from emerging countries such as the BRICs, particularly China.
Balassa Index	An index that can be used to measure the revealed competitive advantage of a country. It was developed by Bela Balassa and Marc Noland.
Brain-drain	Departure of educated or professional people from one country, economic sector or field for another. Most of the time, this is related to better salaries or living conditions.
Civil registration	Process by which countries keep a continuous and complete record of births and deaths of their population.
Civil society	Citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the State and hold State officials accountable. Civil society is voluntary and autonomous from the government.
Clean energy	Energy, such as electricity or nuclear power, that does not pollute the atmosphere when used, as opposed to coal and oil.
Climate finance	Flow of funds towards activities that reduce greenhouse gas emissions or help society adapt to the impact of climate change.
Decentralisation	Transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from central government to intermediate and local governments.
Demos	Greek word meaning people or neighbourhood.
Diaspora	Dispersion or spread of any people from their original homeland.
Direct democracy	Process that allows citizens to decide about specific laws without delegating the decision-making process solely to their elected representatives.
Direct presidential elections	System of choosing political officeholders in which the voters directly cast ballots for the person, persons, or political party that they desire to see elected.
E-democracy	Processes and structures that encompass all forms of electronic communication (through the Internet, mobile and other technologies) between government and the citizen.
Election monitoring	Observation of an election by one or more independent parties, typically from another country or a non-governmental organisation (NGO), primarily to assess the conduct of an election process on the basis of national legislation and international election standards.
E-voting	Use of electronic systems to cast and count votes, aimed at increasing the security of the ballot, speeding up the processing of results, making voting easier and reducing fraud.
GDP	Gross Domestic Product: the monetary value of all the finished goods and services that are produced in a given country within a specific time period.
Illicit Financial Flows	Money that is illegally earned, transferred or utilised. These funds typically originate from three sources: commercial tax evasion, trade misinvoicing and abusive transfer pricing; criminal activities, including the drug trade, human trafficking, illegal arms dealing, and smuggling of contraband; bribery and theft by corrupt government officials.
Imihigo	Process that holds mayors accountable for service delivery in Rwanda.
Indirect presidential elections	Process in which voters in an election do not choose between candidates for an office but rather elect persons who will choose the candidate for them.
Informal and unregulated economies	Activities and income that are partially or fully outside government regulation, taxation or observation.
Kratia	Greek word meaning power, force.
Leapfrog	To advance from one place, position, or situation to another without progressing through all or any of the places or stages in between.
Money Service Businesses (MSBs)	Legal term used by financial regulators to describe businesses that transmit or convert money. The definition was created to encompass more than just banks which normally provide these services, to include non-bank financial institutions.
Money Value Transfer Systems (MVTs)	Financial services that involve the acceptance of cash, cheques, other monetary instruments or other stores of value and the payment of a corresponding sum in cash or other form to a beneficiary by means of a communication, message, transfer, or through a clearing network to which the MVTs provider belongs.
Nominal GDP	Measurement of a country's economic output that includes changes in prices due to inflation or deflation.
Participatory democracy	Democratic procedure that seeks decision-making and consultation from direct citizen participation. It can consist of a variety of mechanisms such as participatory budgeting, neighbourhood councils and consultative referendums.
Photovoltaics	The conversion of light into electricity using semi-conducting materials that exhibit the photovoltaic effect, a phenomenon studied in physics, photochemistry, and electrochemistry.
Political disenfranchisement	Most commonly refers to the removal of the right to vote, which is also called the franchise or suffrage.
Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs)	Individual who is or has been entrusted with a prominent public function, as defined by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Term	Definition
Population of concern	A term used by UNHCR to capture a wide set of people: refugees (including people in refugee-like situations and refugees returned to the country), asylum-seekers (including pending cases), internally displaced persons (including IDPs returned to the country), stateless persons and others of concern.
Populism	Political doctrine that proposes that the common people are exploited by a privileged elite and which seeks to resolve this.
Presidential mandates	A mandate is the authority granted by a constituency to act as its representative. The concept of a government having a legitimate mandate to govern via the fair winning of a democratic election is a central idea of representative democracy.
Proportional representation	Idea that seats in parliament should be allocated so that they are in proportion to the votes cast. Although there are many different types of PR, this is the base requirement for a system to be described as proportional.
Real GDP	Measurement of a country's economic output that takes into account the effects of inflation or deflation. Thus, it reports the gross domestic product as if prices never went up or down, providing a more realistic assessment of growth.
Registered voter	Person who has recorded his/her name in the voting register and is legally entitled to cast a vote.
Remittance sector	Transfers from migrants to resident households in their country of origin.
Structural transformation	Transition of an economy from low productivity and labour-intensive economic activities to higher productivity and skill-intensive activities.
Term limits	Legal restriction that limits the number of terms an officeholder may serve in a particular elected office.
Tipping point	Critical point in a situation, process, or system beyond which a significant and often unstoppable effect or change takes place.
Total dependency ratio	Measure of the ratio of the dependent population (<15 & 65+) per 100 population aged 15-64.
Total factor productivity	Measure of the efficiency of all inputs to a production process. Increases in total factor productivity usually result from technological innovations or improvements.
Voter disenchantment	Voter dissatisfaction or disappointment with the current political situation.
Voter turnout	Percentage of eligible voters who cast a ballot in an election.
Youth bulge	Demographic pattern where the proportion of persons aged 15-24 in the population increases very significantly compared to other age groups.
Youth unemployment	Percentage of the total labour force aged 15-24 that is unemployed.
Zakat	Compulsory giving of a set proportion of one's wealth to charity in Islam.

Acronyms

ACLED	The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project	ISS	Institute for Security Studies
ACSRT/ CAERT	The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism	ISSP	IGAD Security Sector Program
AEO	African Economic Outlook	KFR	Kidnap For Ransom
Al-Shabaab	Movement of Striving Youth	LDLD	Liberia Decentralization and Local Development
AML	Anti-Money Laundering	LDSP	Liberia Decentralization Support Program
AMU	The Arab Maghreb Union	MIF	Mo Ibrahim Foundation
ANC	African National Congress party	MSBs	Money Service Businesses
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism	MVTS	Money Value Transfer Systems
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb	MUJAO	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
ATM	Automated Teller Machine	NCCE	National Commission for Civic Education
AU	African Union	NDI	National Democratic Institute
AYC	African Youth Charter	NFIU	Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation	NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisation
BCE	Before Common Era	NPO	Non-Profit Organisations
CBN	The Central Bank of Nigeria	NSO	National Statistics Office
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States	NYSC	The National Youth Service Corps
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations	OAU	Organisation of African Unity
COMESA	The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	OBS	Open Budget Survey
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations	OECD	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
DIA	Democracy in Africa	OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
EAC	East African Community	PASDEP	Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	PEPs	Politically Exposed Persons
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	PSC	Peace and Security Council
EU	European Union	REC	Regional Economic Communities
FATF	Financial Action Task Force	SADC	Southern African Development Community
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment	SDPRP	Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme
FIS	Islamic Salvation Front	START	The Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
FLM	Macina Liberation Front	STR	Suspicious Transaction Report
GCCS	Global Center for Cooperative Security	TRAC	Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium
GCTF	Global Counter Terrorism Forum	UCLG	The United Cities and Local Governments
GI	Global Integrity	UN	United Nations
GIA	Armed Islamic Group	UNCCT	United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre
GIMAS	Organization of Moroccan Aeronautics Companies	UNDESA	The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
GSPC	Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat	UNDP	United Nations Development Program
GTD	Global Terrorism Database	UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
GTI	Global Terrorism Index	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
IBP	International Budget Partnership	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
ICPAT	IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism	UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
ICU	Islamic Courts Union	UNPAN	United Nations Public Administration Network
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance	USMA	United States Military Academy
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace	V-DEM	Varieties of Democracy
IFF	Illicit Financial Flows	WACD	West Africa Commission on Drugs
IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance	WB	World Bank
ILO	International Labour Organization	WDC	Ward Development Council
IMF	International Monetary Fund	WDI	World Development Indicators
INEC	Independent Electoral Commission	WFP	World Food Programme
IOM	International Organization for Migration	WPP	World Population Prospects
IS	Islamic State		
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant		
ISIL-L	ISIL-Libya		
ISIL-SP	ISIL-Sinai Province		

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Forum report makes use of the latest possible updates and data from a wide range of sources. A reference list containing all the sources that have been used for the creation of this document is provided at the end of the report. Many of the facts and figures have been reprocessed by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. Data were correct at time of research. In some cases, the numbers may not add up to the total due to rounding.

Any data attributed to the years before 2011 are based on the former configuration of the African continent (53 states). Data that are attributed to the years 2011 or later represent the current configuration of Africa (54 states, including South Sudan).

All total population statistics are taken from the 2015 revision of the World Population Prospects from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) unless indicated otherwise. When referring to population projections, medium variant estimates, which constitute the most likely demographic developments, are used.

The definition of youth may vary according to source. While the chosen youth unemployment and youth population data reflect the UN definition of youth (individuals aged 15-24), Afrobarometer surveys classify youth as individuals aged 15-29.

The composition of regions may vary according to source (e.g. while IMF data include Mexico in North America, UNDESA data include Mexico in Latin America and the Caribbean).

Data for Morocco may or may not include Western Sahara depending on the source.

Dollars are US dollars unless indicated otherwise. For the purposes of consistency throughout the report, currency amounts that were not in US dollars when taken from source have been converted to US Dollars through www.xe.com, using the currency conversion rates available on 22.02.2017.

The number of general elections in different election counts throughout the report may vary depending on whether indirect and run-off elections are accounted for.

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In 2014 the annual turnover of Al-Shabaab was estimated at \$70 million, making it the eighth “richest” terrorist organisation in the world, while Boko Haram, with \$25 million, was the tenth.

Some 55,000 migrants are estimated to be smuggled annually from Africa into Europe, generating revenue of around \$150 million.

70% of the continent’s population has seen its Head of State change over the last decade.

In 2016, in 16 countries the President has been in power between ten and 37 years. Their ages vary from 45 to 93.

On average, more than half (58%) of the citizens in Africa feel “completely free” to join any political organisation.

Ethiopia restricts the foreign funding of any group working on human rights or governance to 10% of its revenue.

With the end of the commodity boom, Africa’s annual GDP growth decreased from 6.4% in 2012 to 2.1% in 2016. Africa’s annual GDP growth is projected to recover and reach 4.5% by 2021.

Tertiary-educated Africans have the highest migration rates.

Nine countries - Algeria, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles and Zimbabwe - have changed their constitution over the last decade to limit presidential terms.

South Africa is not able to provide jobs for more than half of its youth population.

Agriculture-focused economies have achieved high economic growth with low youth unemployment.

Africa is expected to warm around 1.5 times faster than the global average.

More than 25% of Africa’s population lives within 100km of the coastal zone, threatened by rising sea levels.



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